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As an attorney in charge of all legal matters related to minerals,
lands, and the environment for the State, quite a few odd, interesting, and
obscure issues come across my desk. This paper is intended to provide a
brief review of several of the largely unknown, but fairly important, legal
matters that are addressed by the State with respect to mineral matters
and to provide guidance to practitioners that should assist in an under-
standing of these matters for future dealings with the State.
II. Of Minerals, Pipelines, and Dead Folk
Although one would generally think it axiomatic that cemeteries are
sacrosanct places that are free from industrial intrusions, especially min-
eral production, such has not historically been the case in Louisiana. In-
deed, following the case of Humphreys et al. v. Bennett Oil Corp.2 in
1940, the Legislature passed specific legislation to protect cemeteries
from intrusions by mineral production operations.
In Humphreys, the defendants had sunk two wells within the con-
fines of a cemetery in Acadia Parish. The plaintiffs, several descendants
of those buried in the cemetery, sued for mental anguish, among other
claims. Interestingly, although the court had little problem awarding the
plaintiffs damages, it did so despite the fact that the particular graves of
the plaintiffs' ancestors were not actually disturbed during the opera-
tions. Although one would think that, with the Humphreys case and the
responsive legislation, the idea of mineral operations being undertaken in
a cemetery would be a thing of the past, it is not. Our office has received
several requests for information in the past years about drilling and con-
ducting seismic surveys in cemeteries in the State. Before reviewing the
current law on this matter, it is worthwhile to examine some of the lan-
I The views and opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the position of the Louisiana Department of Justice or the Attorney
General. The author wishes to thank Andrew J.S. Jumonville for his critical review of a
previous draft of this paper. All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the
author.
2 197 So. 222 (La. 1940).
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guage from the Humphreys decision to see how troubling these activities
can become and how easy it can be for a court to find against a produc-
tion company in such cases. The outcome for the production company
was ominous when the court observed that:
It is admitted that this small Evangeline Cemetery, consisting of a
one-acre plot of ground, was literally converted into an oil field by
the drilling thereon of two producing wells. By such use, this conse-
crated ground, which was destined for the peaceful slumber of the
dead, was transformed into an industrial site, to be exploited for ma-
terial gain.
This use of the cemetery plot divested it of its sacred character, vio-
lated and profaned the sanctity of the graves. This was a desecration
calculated to wound the feelings of the living who had relatives bur-
ied there.
There is testimony in the record that a marble slab, once used to
mark the grave of a child, was placed at the door of the office build-
ing and used as a step.
Finding that the property was properly dedicated to cemetery purposes
and that the above-noted activities were sufficiently disturbing, the Court
found in favor of the plaintiffs for their tort claims.
As noted above, the Court placed great weight in the general sanc-
tity of cemeteries and it did not require that the plaintiffs' ancestors' own
graves actually be disturbed to support their claims of anguish. This con-
cept4 serves as the basis for the codified law that followed in the wake of
this case and that now controls mineral activity in cemeteries.
Immediately following Humphreys, the Legislature passed Act 81 of
1940, which is now codified at La. R.S. 8:901. Under this law, among
other things, the construction of hydrocarbon pipelines and the explora-
tion for and production of minerals is expressly prohibited within the
confines of a cemetery in Louisiana. Thus, there is now no question that
the activities presented in Humphreys are not permissible. Unfortunately
for the practitioner, La. R.S. 8:901 raises more questions than it answers:
Id. at 228.
4 The concept referred to here is that of the sanctity of cemeteries, as embodied in the
following quotation:
These plaintiffs have an interest not only in the particular spots where their rela-
tives are buried, but also a sentimental interest, at least, in the cemetery as a whole,
and therefore such flagrant violation, as here shown, of the sanctity of any part of
this small plot was calculated to cause mental anguish and suffering to those who
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What about shooting seismic in a cemetery? What constitutes a ceme-
tery? What if I remove the burials? These questions are addressed below.
Before discussing the answers to the above questions, a review of
the law itself is in order. Louisiana Revised Statute 8:901 states:
A. It shall be unlawful to use, lease or sell any tract of land which is
platted, laid out or dedicated for cemetery purposes and in which
human bodies are interred, on any part of such tract, for the purpose
of prospecting, drilling or mining; provided that the prohibition of
leasing contained in this section shall not apply to any oil, gas, or
mineral lease that contains a stipulation forbidding drilling or min-
ing operations upon that portion of the leased premises which is in-
cluded within the cemetery.
B. Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than one
hundred dollars nor more than five hundred dollars, or be impris-
oned for not less than thirty days nor more than six months, or both,
and each day during which drilling, mining or prospectinf is con-
ducted or prosecuted shall be considered a separate offense.
One thing that is permissible under La. R.S. 8:901 is the leasing of
property that happens to contain a cemetery so long as there is a stipula-
tion in the lease that none of the prohibited activities will take place
within the confines of the cemetery. Of course, this raises the question of
how are unknown cemeteries going to be treated under this law when
they are inadvertently included within a leased tract? In the case of ceme-
teries for which there is no evidence of their existence on the ground sur-
face, this is covered by La. R.S. 8:671, et seq., which is discussed in de-
tail below. In the case of cemeteries that are visible, avoidance is going
to be the key.
Is it permissible to conduct seismic activity within cemeteries under
La. R.S. 8:901? The law clearly prohibits "prospecting" within cemeter-
s It is important to note that, in addition to the criminal penalties that can be imposed
under La. R.S. 8:901, zealous prosecutors can also likely apply La. R.S. 14:101 to most
activities related to mineral exploration and production in cemeteries. That statute states:
Desecration of graves is the:
(1) Unauthorized opening of any place of interment, or building wherein the dead
body of a human being is located, with the intent to remove or to mutilate the body
or any part thereof, or any article interred or intended to be interred with the said
body; or
(2) Intentional or criminally negligent damaging in any manner, of any grave,
tomb, or mausoleum erected for the dead.
Whoever commits the crime of desecration of graves shall be fined not more than
five hundred dollars, or imprisoned for not more than six months, or both.
- 274 -
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ies. Despite this clear statement restricting prospecting, it is unclear what
exactly falls under that term. There is no Louisiana jurisprudence that
defines "prospecting" in terms of conducting seismic surveys. It should
be noted that there is also no jurisprudence stating that seismic surveys
are not "prospecting." Thus, it has apparently not been an issue before
the Louisiana courts. However, several other states' jurisprudence does
include seismic activity within the term "prospecting."6 Thus, it seems
safe to say that the "prospecting" referred to in La. R.S. 8:901 does in-
deed include seismic operations. Accordingly, under Louisiana law,
such activities are probably prohibited in a cemetery and one does seis-
mic therein at one's own peril and risk. It should be noted, however, that
as a policy matter, the Louisiana Cemetery Board ("LCB") has taken the
position that directional drilling under cemeteries, in a manner that does
not disturb or affect the graves, is permissible and is not a violation of
La. R.S. 8:901.8
Another important question, as alluded to above, is "what consti-
tutes a cemetery in Louisiana?" In a broad sense, the term "cemetery" is
defined in La. R.S. 8:1(7) as
a place used or intended to be used for the interment of the human
dead. It includes a burial park, for earth interments; or a mausoleum,
for vault or crypt interments; or a columbarium, or scattering gar-
den, for cinerary interments; or a combination of one or more of
these.
Thus, a cemetery does not depend on any specialized markings or
border, nor is there any need for a recordation of the existence of a ceme-
tery to be effectuated in the public records.9 What is the practical impli-
cation of this definition for those leasing lands in Louisiana? You may
have a cemetery on the property that you leased and you may not know
it. The bulk of the law related to cemeteries applies regardless of the cha-
racter of the property. Thus, it is of no moment that a cemetery is situated
on private or public property, making the respect for these places of pa-
ramount importance for the exploration and production crews that are on
6 See e.g., Meyer v. Berg, 2007 WL 1430226 (E.D.Wis. 2007); Trutec Oil And Gas,
Inc. v. Western Atlas Intern., Inc., 194 S.W.3d 580 (Tex.App. 14 Dist. 2006).
7 Such has also become the opinion of the Louisiana Attorney General per La. Atty.
Gen. Op. 08-0100.
8 Personal communication between Ryan M. Seidemann, AAG, and Lucy L.
McCann, Director, Louisiana Cemetery Board, Jan. 23, 2009. It is important to note,
however, that for the cemeteries covered by La. R.S. 8:671, et seq., ones over which the
LCB has little or no jurisdiction, the same permissibility for directional drilling cannot be
said with any certainty. The Louisiana Division of Archaeology, which administers La.
R.S. 8:671, et seq, has made no pronouncement indicating whether or not such activities
are acceptable.
9 See generally, Humphreys, supra, n.2; see also, Thomas v. Mobley, 118 So.2d 476
(La.App. I Cir. 1960).
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the ground. Very simply, if there are human remains in the ground, you
have a cemetery - avoid it.
Probably the more likely cemetery situation that can be a significant
issue for mineral activities is the situation in which exploration and pro-
duction - or more likely, pipeline construction - encounters human re-
mains in unmarked graves during operations. In this situation, the Lou-
isiana Unmarked Human Burial Sites Preservation Act ("the Unmarked
Burials Act") 0 applies. Unlike its federal counterpart, the Native Ameri-
can Graves Protection and Repatriation Act ("NAGPRA")," which only
applies to Native American burial sites encountered on federal or tribal
lands,' 2 the Unmarked Burials Act applies to all land - public and private
- and all human remains - not just Native Americans - in unmarked
graves in Louisiana.13 What is the practical relevance of this law to min-
eral operations? If human remains are encountered in any situation, work
must immediately STOP 4 and local law enforcement, the coroner, and
the State Archaeologist must be contacted.' 5 Although no cases have yet
been brought under this law in Louisiana, those reported under
NAGPRA are telling of the penalties for violating these requirements.
In Quechan Indian Tribe v. U.S.,16 numerous claims for the distur-
bance of human remains during electrical line construction were brought
under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). The Southern District of
California allowed NAGPRA to be used as establishing a standard of
care in FTCA actions. Thus, it is possible that NAGPRA or the Un-
1o La. R.S. 8:671, et seq.
" 25 U.S.C. 3001, et seq. A complete discussion of the history and application of
NAGPRA may be found in Ryan M. Seidemann, Bones of Contention: A Comparative
Examination of Law Governing Human Remains from Archaeological Contexts in For-
merly Colonial Countries, 64 LA. L. REv. 545 (2004); Ryan M. Seidemann, Time for a
Change? The Kennewick Man Case and its Implications for the Future of the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act, 106 W. VA. L. REv. 149 (2003).
12 It is important to note, though it is not extremely relevant to this paper, that
NAGPRA also sets forth the law related to managing Native American skeletal collec-
tions and burial artifacts in all U.S. institutions that receive federal funding. 25 U.S.C.
3003, et seq. The law also imposes criminal and civil penalties for the sale of or traffick-
ing in Native American human remains. 18 U.S.C. 1170. It is also important to note that
mere federal involvement in a project (unlike in situations under the National Environ-
mental Policy Act) - for example, with federal permits - is not sufficient to trigger the
application of NAGPRA. See generally, Western Mohegan Tribe and Nation ofNew York
v. New York, 100 F.Supp. 2d 122 (N.D.N.Y. 2000); Abenaki Nation of Mississquoi v.
Hughes, 805 F.Supp. 234 (D.Vt. 1992).
13 La. R.S. 8:672,
La. R.S. 8:678; La. R.S. 8:680(B).
1s La. R.S. 8:680(A) & (C).
16 535 F.Supp. 2d 1072 (S.D. Cal. 2008).
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marked Burials Act may be used in future cases to support claims for
monetary damages.17
In Yankton Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,8 the real
problem of unmarked burial disturbance for mineral operations is
brought into focus: work stoppage. In this case, the Corps of Engineers
was forced to shut down operations to raise the water level in a lake until
inadvertently discovered human remains could be removed from the im-
pact area. A preliminary injunction was issued to effectuate this work
stoppage. Although damages were not a part of this suit, per se, the eco-
nomic damages realized by work stoppages by private parties may be
significant. Thus, in the instance of the discovery of human remains, the
most efficient and effective means for mitigating the potential financial
impacts of a massive work stoppage is to follow the law up front.
Although cases under the Unmarked Burials Act and NAGPRA
have not yet been litigated in Louisiana,' 9 attempts have been made. Dur-
ing initial surveys for the construction of a gas processing plant in the
late 1990s, archaeologists working for Texaco discovered a Native
American burial site in the swamps near Larose, Louisiana. Although the
archaeologists properly reported the find and excavated the site pursuant
to a permit, the United Houma Nation filed suit in the Eastern District of
Louisiana to stop the disturbance of the graves. Because the Houma do
not enjoy federal recognition, Judge McNamara commented, as he dis-
missed the case, that the group has "no more right than anyone else to
protest"20 the excavations.
One further cautionary note is warranted here. If human remains are
inadvertently discovered during mineral-related construction operations,
it is essential that workers are made aware that the removal of human
remains or burial artifacts is illegal under both the Unmarked Burials Act
and NAGPRA. 2 1 In recent years, the Louisiana Attorney General's Of-
fice has taken seriously the illegal treatment of human remains and burial
artifacts, resulting in busts and seizures of numerous items.22 Accord-
1 Generally, aside from the civil penalties involved, the descendant groups are not
provided with a cause of action for damages under NAGPRA. See, Castro Romero v.
Becken, 256 F.3d 349 (C.A. 5 2001). However, with the ruling in Quechan Indian Tribe,
the possibility that NAGPRA (and by implication the Unmarked Burials Act) may be
used to support other theories of recovery is real.
is 83 F.Supp. 2d 1047 (D.S.D. 2000).
19 Excepted from this statement is Castro Romero, supra, which was decided by the
federal Fifth Circuit, but which was a Texas case that did not involve anything directly
relevant to mineral operations.
20 Associated Press, Texaco Wins Fight for Burial Grounds, 6/9/98 TIMES PICAYUNE
C2 (1998).
21 La. R.S. 8:678 and 18 U.S.C. 1170.
2 See e.g., Ryan M. Seidemann, Christopher M. Stojanowski, and Fredrick Rich, The
Identification ofa Human Skull Recovered from an eBay Sale, J. FoREN. Sci. (in press).
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ingly, it is imperative that all employees that have the potential to come
into contact with human remains or burial artifacts while working in the
field be admonished not to take such items and to immediately contact
the appropriate authorities or otherwise risk criminal and civil sanctions
that have the potential to impose vicarious liability sanctions on the em-
ployers as well.
One final note related to cemeteries. When does a cemetery cease to
be a cemetery? Under La. R.S. 8:304(A), which states, in pertinent part,
that:
[a]fter property is dedicated to cemetery purposes pursuant to this
Chapter, neither the dedication nor the title of a plot owner shall be
affected by the dissolution of the cemetery authority, by nonuse on
its part, by alienation of the property, or otherwise, except as pro-
vided in this Title[,]23
a cemetery remains a cemetery until a court has removed the dedication
of that property to cemetery purposes.
Basically, what La. R.S. 8:304(A) means is that, once a piece of
property is used as a cemetery, the property becomes dedicated to that
purpose.24 The mere removal of obvious graves from that property does
not accomplish a removal of the dedication.25 Part of the reason that a
dedication is not de facto removed by the removal of obvious graves is
the reality that, although obvious graves may be removed, other remains
may continue to be interred at a site, 26 thus necessitating continued pro-
23 La. R.S. 8:304(A).
24 See generally, Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1955); Humphreys,
supra, n.2; see also, Thomas v. Mobley, supra, n.9 at 478. It is important to note that the
dedication of property as a cemetery need not be a formal or recorded dedication. Hum-
phreys, supra, n.2 at 225. Indeed, the mere use of a piece of property as a burial place is
enough to effectuate the dedication. Id. Although the Humphreys court (at 227) seems to
suggest that an abandonment of the cemetery may also effectuate a removal of the dedi-
cation, such is not the case. The Humpreys supposition is based, as is the one in Thomas
(at 478), on the premise that if a cemetery is abandoned-in-fact and the descendants have
died off or moved away, that the cemetery "may lose [its] sacred and protected charac-
ter". Thomas, supra, n.9 at 478. However, this supposition stands in stark contrast to the
more recent action of the Louisiana Legislature and the U.S. Congress, both of which
have affirmed the perpetual sacred and protected nature of cemeteries with the Unmarked
Burials Act and NAGPRA, respectively. Thus, this supposition is, at the least, outmoded,
and at most, legislatively overruled.
25 It is also important to note that Louisiana courts have held that the dedication of
property as a cemetery is not subject to prescription. Lester v. Locke, supra, n.24 at 16.
26 See e.g., Bryan S. Haley, GEOPHYSICAL SURVEY OF HIGHLAND CEMETERY, BATON
ROUGE, LOUISIANA (Center for Archaeological Research, Univ. of Mississippi 2003)
(documenting numerous unmarked graves in a historic cemetery). Indeed, Kehoe-
Forutan, et al. have documented a historic cemetery in Pennsylvania for which there are
currently 266 visible markers, but for which estimates of actual space available for buri-
als range as high as 1080. A ground penetrating radar confirmed that there were enough
unmarked burials that the 1080 burial capacity cemetery was full and should not be re-
- 278 -
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tection. The other component to this requirement is legal: La. R.S. 8:306
- the provision of the law that provides for the removal of the dedication
- requires that all remains be removed from the area that is to be undedi-
cated.
It seems perfectly acceptable for the Division of Archaeology, the
LCB, or a court to require the use of remote sensing technology, ground
scraping, or any other methodology that they deem appropriate to ensure
that all burials have been removed from an area in compliance with La.
R.S. 8:304 and 8:306. Following such assurances, the party seeking a
removal of the cemetery dedication must seek a court order removing
that dedication following the procedures outlined in La. R.S. 8:306. No
activities that are inconsistent with cemetery uses can occur in a ceme-
tery until this dedication is removed.
III. Of Court and Legislative Confusion
Perhaps one of the most confusing areas of the law that must be
contended with in mineral situations is the law related to school lands
(also known as sixteenth section lands). What makes this area of the law
so confusing is that the law related to sixteenth section lands has been
piecemealed together by Congress and the Louisiana Legislature over
more than two centuries and it has been poorly interpreted by the courts
as a result. A fairly common situation that relates to sixteenth section
lands and private attorneys has come about in recent years as a result of
the proliferation of legacy site suits. In this regard, the primary issue is
whether the school boards have the authority to sue for environmental
damages to this land on their own (as opposed to the State doing so for
them). This issue is discussed later. However, for the title examiners and
government lawyers that have to determine who has the rights to the
minerals and who has the authority to lease these lands, this area of the
law is also extremely important. Thus, for the benefit of those title exam-
iners and government lawyers, a review of the law related to sixteenth
section lands is herein undertaken.
The sixteenth section lands constitute part of a surveyed rectangular
portion of land, based on a system of survey implemented in 1784-1785
by the Second Continental Congress. "Congress reserved and dedicated
the sixteen [sic] section in each township for the support of public
opened for new burials. Sandra J. Kehoe-Forutan, Bruce A. Campbell, and Michael K.
Shepard, Penetrating the Mystery Beneath Millville Friends Meeting Cemetery, 28 AGS
QUART. 11 (2004). See also, Shannon Seckinger, Picking Up the Pieces: The Osborn
Family Cemetery, Brielle, NJ, AM. CEM. 22 (Apr. 2006) (a discussion of similar ground
penetrating radar results); Garry O'Hara, The Case of the Buried Tombstones: A Story of
Gravestone Recovery and Restoration in Colorado, 32 AGS QUART. 7 (2008).
27 See also, La. R.S. 8:316 for the procedure to be followed for disturbing cemeteries
for noncemetery purposes (a limited list of permissible purposes) both when a cemetery
authority exists and when one does not.
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schools." 28 Although sixteenth section lands exist in every state of the
nation, the laws controlling each state's sixteenth section lands may be
significantly different from one state to another. This reality requires the
specific review of the federal law that granted these lands to Louisiana
that is contained herein.29
As a general matter, the State retains ownership, in trust, over six-
teenth section lands as lands for the public's (school board's) use. The
lands are administered through the State Land Office. The local school
boards are only given custodial authority over the lands and not actual
ownership. 30
In 1806, the United States Congress stated that
...the section 'number sixteen,'... shall be reserved in each township
for the support of schools within the same.3 1
This reservation of sixteenth section lands was reaffirmed by Con-
gress with the same language in 181 1.32 These reserved lands vested in
the State of Louisiana upon statehood in 1812.
There has been some debate as to what interest was actually trans-
ferred to the State by the 1806 Act. However, following a series of Unit-
ed States Supreme Court rulings on the nature of certain sixteenth section
land grants, it is clear that this grant was intended to give the State a fee
simple interest in the sixteenth sections. This interest becomes acutely
obvious under Papasan, which found that the same fee simple classifica-
tion existed in Mississippi.35 Although that same case cautions that the
law affecting each state's sixteenth section lands must be interpreted in
light of the unique federal statute granting that land, and despite the fact
that Mississippi and Louisiana were granted their sixteenth section lands
in different acts of Congress, the virtually identical language of these
grants requires a convergent interpretation of the law as it applies to Lou-
isiana and Mississippi sixteenth section lands.36 Thus it is clear that Lou-
isiana, like its eastern neighbor, received a fee simple interest in its six-
28 La. Atty. Gen. Op. 96-188.
29 Papasan v. Allain, 106 S.Ct. 2932, FN 18 (1986).
30 See, La. Atty. Gen. Op. 96-188. See also, Ebey v. Avoyelles Parish School Board,
2003-765 (La. App. 3 Cir. 12/17/03), 861 So.2d 910.
31 2 Stat. 39 1, Sec. 11.
32 2 Stat. 662, Sec. 10.
3 John L. Madden, FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LouISIANA 232 (Claitor's Publish-
ing Division 1973); La. Atty. Gen. Op. 96-188.
3 See, Papasan, supra, n.29 at 2941-2; see also, State of Alabama v. Schmidt, 34
S.Ct. 301, 302 (1914); Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173, 182 (1855).
3 See also, Holmes S. Adams, et al., School Law in Jeffrey Jackson and Mary Miller,
eds., ENCYCLOPEDIA OF Mississippi LAW § 65 (West 2004).
36 See, Papasan, supra, n.29 at FN 18; 2 Stat. 391, Sec. 11; 3 Stat. 375, Sec. 3.
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teenth section lands when those lands vested in the State in 1812. This
absolute (or fee simple) grant of sixteenth section lands is supported by
State of Louisiana v. Joyce," stating that:
[t]hose lands were unequivocally and unconditionally appropriated
to a purpose for the carrying out of which the future state alone was
looked to.38
Additionally, the Joyce court goes on to state that,
...though such states were in honor bound to apply [the lands] to the
purpose for which they were given, the validity of sales of them by
the states is not dependent upon a compliance with a qualified per-
mission to sell given by Congress after the lands had ceased to be-
long to the United States.
Despite the State's fee simple interest, in 1843, the United States
Congress passed "An Act to Authorize the Legislatures of the States of
Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, and Tennessee, to Sell the Lands Hereto-
fore Approriated for the Use of Schools in those States" (hereinafter,
"the Act"). The Act recognized that the ownership, and thus the ability
to sell sixteenth section lands, was retained by the states and did not fall
to the various political subdivisions that may actually care for the lands
and administer the schools. This is evident in the statement that,
the Legislatures of...Louisiana.. .are hereby, authorized to provide by
law for the sale and conveyance in fee simple, of all or any part of
the lands heretofore reserved and appropriated by Congress for the
41
use of schools within said States...
However, based upon the foregoing analysis, to the extent that the
1843 Act purports to grant Louisiana the power to sell its sixteenth sec-
tion lands, that Act is superfluous, as such power vested in the State by
virtue of the fee simple grant of these same lands when the sixteenth sec-
tion lands vested in the State in 1812. While the Fifth Circuit in Joyce,
supra, does not expressly mention this, it seems to strongly imply that
Congress recognized that its 1843 Act was not necessary in order for the
State to have authority to sell the lands at issue (i.e., sixteenth sections)
which it already owned in fee simple absolute when it ended its Act with
the proviso,
...so far as the assent of the United States may be necessa7 to the
confirmation thereof [i.e., sales of sixteenth sections lands].4
3 261 F. 128, 132 (C.A. 5 1919), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 484 (1920).
n Id.
3 Id. at 133.
4 5 Stat. 600 (emphasis added).
41 Id.
42 Id. (emphasis added).
-281-
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This is evidenced by the fact that the Court went to the trouble of
quoting Section 4 of the 1843 Act, the "confirmation as may be neces-
sary" clause, and by the following language from its decision in Joyce,
viz:
[The] state having been destined, from the time the territory in-
cluded in it was acquired by the United States, to have exclusive and
plenary power over the schools for the support of which those Six-
teenth Sections were set apart (Alabama v. Schmidt)...43
The terms of the act of February 15, 1843, indicate that in enacting
it Congress assumed that previously there had been consummated
appropriations of the sixteenth sections for the use of schools within
the states mentioned, and that, notwithstanding such prior disposi-
tion of these sections, it remained in the power of Congress to de-
termine the method to be pursued by those states in disposing of
their school lands. The former assumption is inconsistent with the
latter one. The consummated gifts of the school lands to the states
being absolute.. .[t]he sales by the state of the land sued for being
questioned only on the ground that such sales were not made in the
manner prescribed by the act of February 15, 1843, the attack on the
validity of those sales cannot be sustained. The state had the power
to sell those lands without the consent of Congress."
Thus, it is clear that it has been legal for the State of Louisiana to
sell sixteenth section lands since 1812. Further, because the local school
boards or other relevant political subdivisions have only custodial au-
thority over the lands (as the beneficiaries of the lands held in trust for
them by the State as the owner), there is no reason to believe that their
permission or authority must be sought prior to a sale of such lands. In
other words, at least historically, the State has had the authority to sell
sixteenth section lands of its own motion, subject to the limitations set
forth below (i.e., without the local school board's permission).45 Indeed,
43 State ofAlabama v. Schmidt, supra, n.34 at 302 (1914).
4 Joyce, supra, n.37 at 131 and 133, respectively.
45 La. Atty. Gen. Op. 94-234. In the interest of completeness, the subject of the ex-
change of sixteenth section lands should also be considered. Louisiana Revised Statute
17:87.6 generally allows a parish or city school board to dispose of any school site which
is not used. This authority to dispose has been interpreted by the Attorney General's Of-
fice as including the authority to exchange property. See, La. Atty. Gen. Op. 86-591. A
school board's general authority under La. R.S. R.S. 17:87.6 is nevertheless subject to the
restrictions on the disposal of sixteenth section lands. This reality is confirmed by the
provisions of La. R.S. 41:891 et seq., governing the disposal of unused school lands.
Louisiana Revised Statute 41:891, by its own express provisions, does not apply to six-
teenth section lands. On the other hand, La. R.S. 41:711, et seq., which does apply to
sixteenth section lands, contains no provisions allowing an exchange. Thus, it appears
that the exchange of sixteenth section lands in Louisiana is prohibited. However, the
Legislature may give a school board the authority to exchange a certain parcel of six-
teenth section land for other designated parcels to be utilized for public school purposes.
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the local school boards must seek legislative authority to divest them-
selves of sixteenth section lands."
As alluded to above, the authority to sell sixteenth section lands
does not rest solely with the State. Pursuant to La. R.S. 41:711, when the
State intends to sell sixteenth section lands, the treasurer of the parish in
which the lands are situated:
shall take the sense of the inhabitants of the township with reference
to whether or not any lands heretofore reserved and appropriated by
congress for the use of schools shall be sold.
Briefly, La. R.S. 41:711 outlines the methodology for the treasurer
to follow to "take the sense of the inhabitants." This procedure includes
holding an election, following advertisement of the intent to sell, with the
majority of the inhabitant3' votes (i.e., the legal voters) controlling
whether or not the sixteenth section lands will be sold.
Louisiana Revised Statute 17:87, paragraph two, appears to conflict
with La. R.S. 41:711 when it states that the election for the sale of lands
is to be conducted by the parish school board rather than the parish treas-
urer. However, this discrepancy, which appears to have been an over-
sight in subsequent statutory updates, is clarified by La. Atty. Gen. Op.
No. 1916-18, p.446. This opinion states that, pursuant to Act 120 of
1916, the sale of sixteenth section lands "is taken out of the hands of the
Parish Treasurer.. .and placed in the hands of the School Board.""
Aside from providing the methodology for conducting the election,
La. R.S. 41:711 supports the reality that, in many cases, the local school
boards are at the mercy of the State and the residents when it comes to
the sale of the sixteenth section lands that they administer. However,
when such lands are sold by the State, whether purposeflly or errone-
ously, the school board is entitled to a portion of the sale proceeds, as
well as the revenues from mineral or timber leases or other activities.49
The funds remain on deposit with the State treasury and will accrue an
interest of four percent per annum.50 School boards have
See, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 94-234. There are several statutes enacted by the Legislature
for this purpose. For example, La. R.S. 41:897 provides Bossier Parish School Board
with the authority to dispose of sixteenth section lands through an exchange.
46 Meyer v. State, 121 So. 604 (La. 1929). Such sales may only be made in such a
manner as to carry out the purpose of the dedication of these lands for the benefit of pub-
lic education.
4 La. Atty. Gen. Op. 1916-18, pp. 446-7.
4 Id.
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the right to use the said funds in the acquisition, construction, and
equipping of public school buildings and other school facilities.5'
The predial lease of sixteenth section lands presents a different situ-
ation from the sale of those same lands. Local school boards are only
allowed to lease, for surface purposes, sixteenth section lands over which
they have custodial authority if a majority of the legal voters are against
the sale of the land. Leases must be conducted pursuant to a resolution
of the board. Funds realized by the school board from the lease of six-
teenth section lands must be credited to the general school fund of the
parish. Further, whether or not sixteenth section lands are at issue, the
initial term of a lease of school board property may not exceed ten (10)
years.
It should be noted that the Louisiana Legislature has established
special procedures for the granting of mineral leases covering "sixteenth
section or school indemnity lands" in La. R.S. 30:151 through 30:158.5
In general, the school board may request and direct the State Mineral
Board ("SMB") to lease its land, and often the mineral lease is executed
by the SMB (but the school board administers the lease as lessor as if the
lease were granted by it).55 If the school board does not elect to do this, it
may advertise for and grant the lease itself.56 In any event, all mineral
leases from a school board must also be approved by the SMB in order to
be valid. Absent such approval by the SMB, the mineral lease "is null
and void."5 7 It is also important to note that, in mineral leasing situations,
special provisions are made to distinguish between "sixteenth section or
schooi indemnity lands."58 The latter must only be leased by the SMB
and the allocation of the funds in each of the two cases is expressly pro-
vided for.59
51 Id.
52 La. R.S. 41:716. This appears to be in conflict with La. R.S. 17:87, which places no
restriction on the predial lease of such lands. However, as La. R.S. 41:716 represents the
latest pronouncement of the Legislature on this topic, it controls. See, Ellis v. Acadia
Parish School Board, 29 So.2d 461, 464-465 (La. 1946), reh'g denied (1947) and La.
Atty. Gen. Op. 1940-2, p.3621. See also, Davis v. Franklin Parish School Board, 412
So.2d 1131 (1982).
5 La. R.S. 41:1217(A). La. R.S. 41:1217 goes on to allow extensions to the ten-year
period provided in Subsection (A).
5 Less section 157, which was repealed by Act 292 of 1950.
ss La. R.S. 30:153.
5 La. R.S. 30:154 through 156.
s7 La. R.S. 30:158.
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The Legislature has also seen fit, on several occasions, to cure past
procedural inconsistencies related to the sale of sixteenth section lands.6
It is through these statutes that the confusion regarding how to administer
such lands becomes evident. Though not addressed by the Legislature,
logic dictates that these ratifications can only go back as far as the time at
which the State gained the authority from the United States to sell six-
teenth section lands in 1812 (upon its admission to the Union). In 1934,
the Legislature enacted La. R.S. 41:1322, which ratifies and confirms
sixteenth section land sales made prior to 1900,
notwithstanding informalities in the sales relative to the appraise-
ment and offering the lands in lots of forty acres, where it is affirma-
tively shown that the purchase price of the lands has actually been
paid to the state treasury...
This statute further requires that the officer who made the sale had
filed a proces verbal and granted a deed to the purchaser, and that the
purchaser actually went into possession of the property, for the sale to be
ratified and confirmed. This statute was clarified, in 1942, by La. R.S.
41:1323, which also applied to sixteenth section land sales made prior to
1900. This statute requires, in addition to the procedural requirements of
La. R.S. 41:1322, that in order for the sale prior to 1900 to be ratified,
there must also be, in the deed filed by the officer who made the sale, a
record of the election in favor of selling the land under La. R.S. 41:711.
Additionally, La. R.S. 41:1323 requires that where the deed states that
the sale was made for cash payment or on credit, receipt of the cash sale
or cancellation of the mortgage shall grant the purchaser the full benefit
of the property.
In 1944, the Legislature extended the period for which the sale of
sixteenth section lands could be cured of procedural inconsistencies to
sales made before 1914.61 This statute largely embodies the same content
as the earlier statutes of 1934 and 1942, discussed above. The Legislature
later extended these curative mechanisms, via La. R.S. 41:1323.1
through La. R.S. 41:1323.3, to ratify and confirm sixteenth section land
sales that had occurred prior to July 1, 1956.
Ultimately, the result of these statutes is that, in spite of informali-
ties in the procedure by which sixteenth section lands were sold prior to
July 1, 1956, as long as the officer who made the sale made a deed to the
purchaser (and in the case of a credit sale, that the mortgage has been
cancelled) and recited that an election was had and that the statutory
formalities were complied with, then any inconsistencies in the proce-
dure for the sale that may have actually existed were cured. The practical
effect of these laws is to remove from the mineral leasing jurisdiction of
6 See generally, La. R.S. 41:1321 through 41:1323.3.
61 La R.S. 41:1321 (as amended in 1948).
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many school boards sixteenth section lands that had been procedurally
improperly sold in the past. Thus, title searches are essential for all six-
teenth section lands to determine if those lands are actually still school
lands.
In a departure from the previously discussed statutes regarding the
ratification of sixteenth section land sales, the Legislature, in 1978, en-
acted La. R.S. 41:1323.5. This statute applies only to irregular and frac-
tional sixteenth sections and states that, with respect to this category of
lands, only sales made prior to 1860 are cured as to the same procedural
defects in the sale as those discussed for La. RS. 41:1321 through
41:1323.3. Because this statute is the most recent treatment of this topic
by the Legislature, and because the Legislature saw fit to single out ir-
regular and fractional sixteenth sections, it is apparent that these lands
are to be treated differently than other sixteenth section lands. Therefore,
should there be sixteenth section lands that are irregular or fractional, a
school board may seek recompense, through La. R.S. 41:631 et seq., for
the sale of those lands that occurred on or subsequent to January 1, 1860,
if the procedure for sales of such lands were not properly followed.
Thus, as to sales of sixteenth section lands, there is only support in
the legislation for the State, on its own, or the school board, both needing
a majority vote of the township's legal voter-residents, to sell, through
and only through the State of Louisiana.62 Thus, the discovery of any
such sale by a private entity is invalid.6 3 Because private individuals can-
not acquisitively prescribe against the State in order to gain ownership of
propetty, absent an express statute waiving sovereign immunity to pre-
scription," there can be no prescription against such property were such
a scenario discovered.s
As to sales of sixteenth section land accomplished post-1812, if the
sales are not in compliance with the formal sale requirements found in
La. R.S. 41:711 through 41:894, or for the relevant years covered by the
curative statutes and their sales requirements," these sales are invalid.
Because there is no acquisitive prescription against the State and because
the State is not subject to the peremptive period in which to bring actions
to reclaim its property, there is no statute of limitations under which the
62 See generally, La. R.S. 41:631 through 41:981. As discussed below, these same
entities can also lease the lands.
63 See generally, Barton's Executrix v. Hempkin, 19 La. 510 (La. 1841).
6 La. Const. Art. XII, § 13. This maxim also holds true in cases of liberative prescrip-
tion. See generally, Todd v. Stale, 474 So 2d 430 (La. 1985).
65 See, La. Const, Art. IX, Sec. 4(B); La. Civ. Code Arts. 450 and 453, cmt. (c). See
also, Liner v. Terrebonde Prh School Board, 519 So.2d 777 (App. Cir. 1, 1988); Todd
v. State, supra, n.64; City of New Orleans v. Magnon, 4 Mart (o.s.) 2, 3 (La. 1815).
6 La. R.S. 41:1321 through 1323.3 and 1323.5 (1812 through July 1, 1956 for regular
sixteenth F zations and 1812 through 1860 for irregular or fractional sections).
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State is restricted from reclaiming its sixteenth section lands.67 Such suits
to reclaim sixteenth section lands may be implemented, on behalf of the
State, by the Attorney General under La. R.S. 41:921, or by the local
school boards under La. R.S. 41:961.
Of additional interest is La. R.S. 41:640. This statute provides a me-
chanism whereby school districts may seek some amount of recompense
when they have been erroneously divested of their custodial sixteenth
section lands by the State. This statute provides, in pertinent part, that
[w]here sixteenth section lands.. .have been erroneously sold by the
state...such deficiencies will be properly adjusted...and the amounts
so determined will be credited to the parish school boards of the
parishes in which the townships are situated...
Additionally, La. R.S. 41:640 states that such
amounts so credited shall be treated as loans to the state on which
the state shall pay interest at the rate of four percent per annum.
The language of this statute necessarily raises the question of what
constitutes an "erroneous" sale by the State. Though no definition of "er-
roneous" exists in the statute, it is probable that this term refers to the
State's failure to follow the formal requirements for such a sale. Al-
though La. R.S 41:1321 et seq. cures the errors of form in pre-July 1,
1956 sales of sixteenth section lands, there is no legislation that cures
sales for errors of form after July 1, 1956. Thus, if a school board were
able to demonstrate that an "erroneous" sale of sixteenth section land
was made after July 1, 1956, then the school board should be able to
make a claim for a credit, plus interest, from the State for the sale. In ad-
dition, though it seems that evidence to support such a claim would be
extremely difficult to come by, it is conceivable that sales of sixteenth
section lands prior to the State having authority to do so (i.e., prior to
1812) may be challenged as to their validity. However, this would only
apply to sixteenth section lands that were sold by the Territory of Orleans
(the territorial predecessor to the State of Louisiana) prior to the State
gaining such power to sell in 1812.
An additional important caveat regarding the ownership and man-
agement authority of sixteenth section lands is in order. Sixteenth sec-
67 La. Civ. Code Arts. 450 and 453, cmt. (c); Bruning v. City ofNew Orleans, 115 So.
733, 737 (on first reh'g, La. 1927); Gulf Oil Corporation v. State Mineral Board et al..
317 So.2d 576, 586-7 (on reh'g, La. 1975).
* See also, State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish School Board v. Plaquemines Parish
Government, 652 So.2d 1, 4 (App. 4 Cir. 1995).
69 La. R.S. 41:640 (emphasis added).
70 Louisiana was created out of the Territory of Orleans, while the rest of the Louisi-
ana Purchase was originally known as the District of Louisiana. See, Ory G. Poret, His-
tory ofLand Titles in the State ofLouisiana, 1 LA. HIST. Q. 25 (1973).
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tions that are wholly or partially covered by navigable waters may be
treated with an entirely different suite of laws than those discussed
above. The reason for this caveat is because the determination of rights
as to such sixteenth sections is dependant upon each unique factual situa-
tion, because, historically, sixteenth sections were granted to schools
without any consideration for where they fell geographically or topog-
raphically. Thus, if they fell over navigable waters, the school boards
could apply to the United States General Land Office (and later to the
State Land Office) for what are called "lieu lands" or "indemnity lands".
These lieu lands were terrestrial federal or State lands that were ex-
changed for the submerged portions of the sixteenth section lands origi-
nally granted by Congress, such submerged portions (if navigable-in-
fact) belonging only to the State of Louisiana by virtue of its inherent
sovereignty and the equal footing doctrine. Thus, in many cases, sub-
merged sixteenth sections were swapped for other lands somewhere else
in the State, to make up for the navigable waters loss in the regular, in-
place, sixteenth sections. The practical effect of these swaps was to pro-
vide full ownership of nonsixteenth section lands to school boards - not
necessarily within their own parishes. In those cases, the submerged six-
teenth sections became the property of the State in full ownership and
none of the sixteenth section specific laws apply to mineral leasing of
such fractional and irregular lands. In cases where no lieu lands were
granted, presumably, the school boards still retain the managerial and
mineral rights to those lands. In other situations, sixteenth sections that
were once dry land have now become eroded water bottoms (especially
in the coastal areas). These lands, as is discussed more fully below, were
treated, as they eroded, as nonsixteenth section lands - a possibly unjust
reality that has now been corrected by legislation.
In the interest of completeness, we must consider the impacts of Act
158 of 2007 on mineral issues related to sixteenth section lands. This law
deals only with what is to become of royalties derived from eroded six-
teenth section lands. In pertinent part, this Act states that:
In the event any such eroded or subsided lands are covered by an
existing oil and gas lease or other contract granted by the state in its
sovereign capacity, all proceeds from production and other reve-
nues, generated after July 1, 2007, and attributable to the eroded
lands, shall be credited to the account of the current school fund of
the parish having an interest in the sixteenth section or indemnity
lands.n
The practical effect of this Act is to reallocate royalties after July 1,
2007. As discussed above, sixteenth sections that contain navigable wa-
ters are even more unique in legal treatment than their terrestrial siblings.
n This provision enacted La. R.S. 41:642(A)(2).
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Historically, if a sixteenth section was granted to a school board and part
of the land in that sixteenth section eroded into a navigable waterway,
the portion of minerals attributable to that eroded land was allocated to
the State as the owner of all water bottoms in the State (as opposed to
allocated to the particular school board's fund). What Act 158 does is to
reverse this process after its effective date. On a prospective basis, all
mineral proceeds attributable to eroded sixteenth section lands are now to
be paid to the school board(s) in the township to which the sixteenth sec-
tion was originally granted. This law seems to be consistent with the
treatment of sixteenth section lands in general. As has been belabored
above, none of these lands were ever owned by the school boards. Thus,
it should not matter, for the practical purposes of royalty distribution,
whether they are eroded or uneroded lands. The State still retains owner-
ship and the school boards still receive the benefits. It is understandable
why these lands had been treated differently in the past, as the minerals
from eroded lands generally inure to the benefit of the State. However,
this Act likely represents a correction that is consistent with the congres-
sional intent for these lands.
Another important, but rather technical question related to sixteenth
section lands is whether a mineral lease of sixteenth section land is con-
sidered a State lease or a State agency lease. As discussed above, six-
teenth section lands were granted to the states by Congress to be held in
trust for the benefit of the schools. Thus, although school boards have
been granted the authority to lease sixteenth sections for minerals in the
same statute as agency land leases are authorized,72 this authority is con-
sistent with (and is likely a codification of) the school boards' manage-
rial authority over the lands and it speaks nothing to the lands' classifica-
tion as State or State agency property. Because the law related to six-
teenth section lands considers the land to be State land, such leases
should also likely be treated as State leases rather than State agency leas-
es. This conclusion is also supported by the Fifth Circuit's finding that
the State is not merely a nominal party in suits regarding sixteenth sec-
tion lands.7 3
It should also be pointed out that, it does not seem to matter what
the classification of these lands is from a practical perspective. Under La.
R.S. 30:154(C),
... all funds realized from these leases shall be paid to the school
board of the parish where the lands are situated...
72 La. R.S. 30:152(A).
73 Louisiana v. Union Oil Co. of California, 458 F.3d 364 (C.A. 5 2006); see also,
State v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 2005 WL 2406155 (W.D.La. 2005); Vermilion
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Thus, there is no practical difference resulting from classifying these
leases as a State rather than a State agency lease. Under La. R.S. 30:136
and La. R.S. 30:136.1, excess funds from State leases are credited to the
Bond Security and Redemption Fund, among other things. Under La.
R.S. 30:145, ten percent of the funds realized from State leases must be
credited to the parishes covered by the lease. 74 Under, La. R.S. 30:153,
all funds go directly to the agency that owns the property being leased.
However, it appears that La. R.S. 30:154(C) trumps La. R.S. 30:136, La.
R.S. 30:136.1, and La. R.S. 30:145, directing sixteenth section land-
realized mineral funds to the appropriate school boards.
Because sixteenth section lands are of such a special character, an-
other necessary question to ask when dealing with them is: Does the
SMB need any authority from the school boards to lease sixteenth sec-
tion lands? There is no language in the Revised Statutes on this issue.
However, the Louisiana courts have spoken to this issue in at least two
cases. In both State ex rel. Plaquemines Parish School Bd. v. Plaque-
mines Parish Governmentsand State v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.,76 it
was clearly stated that the SMB did not have the independent authority to
let mineral leases on sixteenth section lands. Rather, the authority to cre-
ate mineral leases on these lands rested solely with the school boards
"owning an interest" therein. For the following reasons, I believe that
this position is incorrect:
The Revised Statutes provide a fairly complex method for the sale
of sixteenth sections. However, the right to sell these lands is not re-
stricted to the school boards. Under the maxim, eo quod plus sit, simper
inest et minus ("the greater includes the lesser"), it should logically fol-
low that, if the State retained the more substantial right to sell sixteenth
section lands without school board authority, that the lesser encumbrance
of mineral leasing can be done without school board authority. That said,
it seems reasonable to assume that the SMB could obtain such authority
from the school boards, likely in the form of a resolution, to lease the
lands on their behalf. However, such a grant of authority would seem to
be superfluous. In addition, because all of the proceeds of the leasing of
sixteenth section minerals are dedicated to the school boards with an in-
terest in the particular sixteenth section, and the State (i.e., the general
fund) does not gain any benefit, there would not seem to be a conflict of
interest if the SMB were legally able to lease the minerals without school
board authority.
74 In addition, if these lands are leased by the SMB, the State gets a ten percent (10%)
fee (La. R.S. 30:124) and it retains the $20.00 per acre fee because it is a lease of State
lands (La. R.S. 30:136.1(D)).
7 93-2339 (La.App. 4 Cir. 12/15/94), 652 So.2d 1.
76 197 So. 140 (La. 1940).
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However, my opinion is merely academic in this respect. The Lou-
isiana Supreme Court has spoken, so the matter is settled for now. The
SMB needs the authority of the school boards to lease sixteenth section
lands under the school boards' authority.
The above-discussed requirement of school board authority raises
questions with respect to dually allocated sixteenth sections. For many
reasons, including that sixteenth sections often fall across township lines,
multiple school boards may have valid claims tc partial shares of a par-
ticular sixteenth section. When this occurs, whose permission is required
under the caser cited above to let mineral leases on such lands? Again,
there is no law on this issue. However, should the SMB only have a reso-
lution to so lease from the school board with the majority interest in the
property (when two or more school boards have authority over one six-
teenth section), La. R.S. 41:712, which applies to the sale of sixteenth
sections that straddle township lines, seems instructive regarding what to
do in such a situation. This statute provides the school board with the
greater interest in a sixteenth section with the sole authority to sell the
sixteenth section and pro-rata share the sale proceeds with the other
school board(s). Thus, it seems logical that the SMB should need only
the approval from the school board with the greater interest in the six-
teenth section at issue in order to let a mineral lease thereon (if the inter-
ests are equal, then likely each school board should be consulted).
It should be noted, however, that, should any litigation result from
the granting of such a mineral lease, all school boards with an interest in
receiving a share of the mineral proceeds are necessary parties to the liti-
gation." Although the First Circuit has found that any school board with
an interest in the mineral proceeds has an interest as a necessary party to
any litigation over particular sixteenth secions, it did not address the
question of who has the authority to create a mineral lease on the land.
As noted above, one main area in which sixteenth section lands
have become an important issue for private attorneys is with respect to
legacy lawsuits for environmental damage.78 In 2004, the First Circuit
rendered its decision in the case, Terrebonne Parish School Board v.
Southdown, Inc.79 This case derives from alleged damages to sixteenth
section school lands in Terrebonne Parish caused by tae dredging of ca-
nals through freshwater marshes for mineral exploration and produc-
tion.80 The damages occurred over a period of forty years and took place
7 See, Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Bass Enterprises Production Co., 2002-
2119 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/8/03) 852 So.2d 541.
78 See, Ryan M. Seidemann, Louisiana Wetlands and Water Law: Recent Jurispru-
dence and Post-Katrina and Rita Imperatives, 51 Loy. L. REv. 861 (2006).
7 03-0402 (La.App. 1 Cir. 7/14/04); 887 So. 2d 8.
so Id. at 9-10.
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under numerous mineral leases.8' The school board filed suit under tort
and contract theories. The school board claimed that it only recently be-
came aware of the damages done to these lands by the mineral lessees. 82
All of the claims were dismissed by the trial court as prescribed, and the
First Circuit affirmed.
The court held that the State's ban on prescription could not be
maintained by an entity that was not the State itself or suing on behalf of
the State. The court reasoned that because the school board brought the
suit in its own name and claimed to be the owner of the property in ques-
tion, it could not avail itself of the State's immunity to prescription.
While this reasoning is likely correct, the school board's contention that
it was the owner of the land is patently erroneous. That being said, the
school boards are entitled to bring suits in their own name with respect to
the lands, but they are not the owners of the lands.
This case brings up several interesting matters. First, had the State
sued for the damage to the property, the prescription issue would have
been defeated. The reason for this outcome would be that prescription
cannot run against the State.84 Second, the case tends to give an incorrect
picture of ownership of sixteenth section lands. As discussed above,
these lands are owned by the State, not the school boards.85
The courts again misstated and misunderstood sixteenth section land
law in Terrebonne Parish School Board v. Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co.86 In this case, the court misstated the ownership of sixteenth section
lands, creating a potentially erroneous precedent in dicta. The court states
that the title to sixteenth section lands passed from the United States to
the school board.8 7 This assertion is simply incorrect. As demonstrated,
supra, title to sixteenth section lands vested in the State upon statehood
in 1812. The State is the owner of these lands and the school boards
merely function as administrators or custodians. The volume of incorrect
81 Id. at 10.
8 Id.
8 Id. at 14.
8 La. Const. art. XII, § 13. This maxim also holds true in cases of liberative prescrip-
tion. See generally, Todd v. State, supra, n.64.
as In all fairness, the courts are not the only ones still making this mistake. The Lou-
isiana Legislature, as recently as the 2005 Regular Session, incorrectly stated the owner-
ship of the sixteenth section lands in H.B. 184, as land to which school boards hold title.
Unfortunately, this bill made it to the Governor's desk and was signed into law as Act
417 of 2005 before the error was noticed. Without belaboring the point that has been
discussed fully herein, the school boards do not hold title to these lands, the State does.
Hopefully an amendment in a future legislative session can redact this erroneous state-
ment in Act 417 of 2005.
86 290 F.3d 303 (5th Cir. 2002).
87 Id. at 307.
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interpretations of sixteenth section land law is troubling because errone-
ous holdings on this matter could result in the stripping of valuable land
from the State or in future inconveniences to landowners.88
Although extremely confusing, the law that controls sixteenth sec-
tion lands is extremely important in Louisiana mineral law. It determines
proper parties, leasing and sales authority, and proper royalty payment,
among many other things. Thus, practitioners, both public and private
should be on guard for errors and inconsistencies anytime a sixteenth
section is at issue.
-V. Of Erosion, Accretion, and Freezes"
As a general matter, the Louisiana Civil Code holds that:
[p]ublic things that belong to the state are such as running waters,
the waters and bottoms of natural navigable water bodies, the terri-
torial sea, and the seashore.90
Thus any analysis of the ownership of a water bottom must begin
with the general premise that the State is the owner of the beds of all na-
vigable water bodies within its borders. This is important to mineral law
88 One oft-cited example of such incorrect interpretations is the comment that anoma-
lous sixteenth section lots are "not reserved for schools by acts of Congress." Bres v.
Louviere, 37 La. Ann. 736 (La. 1885). There is absolutely no evidence that Congress ever
intended for incomplete (that is, fractional sections sixteen, not containing the normal full
640 acres) sixteenth sections not to inure to the states for educational use. Indeed, it ap-
pears that the Bres Court, as well as at least one other Louisiana Supreme Court ruling,
misinterpreted survey terminology in rendering its decision. See also, Lauve v. Wilson, 38
So. 522 (La. 1905). The Bres Court seems to assume that radiating lots and anomalous
lots are the same thing or similar enough to warrant similar treatment. Such could not be
further from reality. Radiating lots are lots that radiate out from rivers and bayous (gener-
ally back to the 40 or 80 arpent line) and were part of original colonial land grants (such
as those from the Kings of Spain and France). It is accurate that these lots were not in-
tended to be included in the sixteenth section school lands inasmuch as the United States
did not "own" these lands - having confirmed the royal land grants of the previous sover-
eigns - and thus did not have them to convey them. Anomalous, or "irregular lots," how-
ever, are merely oddly shaped (as opposed to the standard 640 acre sections) and were
granted to the states by Congress. If such were not the case, it would make no sense for
the states to have been granted extra, or "in-lieu," federal land from other sections to
make up for the shortfall in these oddly shaped lots. Thus, there is erroneous case law that
could cause the State to think that it does not have title to lands that it most definitely
does. Debra LeMoine discusses an example of this problem. Debra LeMoine, Options
Sought to Recover Land: Livingston's Sixteenth Section in Question, THE ADvoc. (Baton
Rouge), Aug. 22, 2005 at 3-B. In this situation, an anomalous sixteenth section is at the
heart of a public versus private debate over ownership.
89 It should be noted that there are four basic situations in which mineral interests to
land may be affected: (1) property that was land and is still land; (2) property that was
water and is still water; (3) property that was land, but is now water; and (4) property that
was water, but is now land. This portion of the paper deals with the latter two situations.
90 La. C.C. Art. 450.
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because it determines who the proper parties to a lease are, and, in the
event of production, to whom royalties are properly payable.
The basis for the State's interest in eroded land9 l is articulated in the
Louisiana Constitution. The relevant parts of the 1974 Constitution are
found within Article IX, and state, in pertinent part:
Section 3. The legislature shall neither alienate nor authorize the
alienation of the bed of a navigable water body, except for purposes
of reclamation by the riparian owner to recover land lost through
erosion.
Section 4. The mineral rights on property sold by the state shall be
reserved ... The mineral rights on land, contiguous to and abutting
navigable waterbottoms reclaimed by the state through the imple-
mentation and construction of coastal restoration projects shall be
reserved, except when the state and the landowner having the right
to reclaim or recover the land have agreed to the disposition of min-
eral rights, in accordance with the conditions and procedures pro-
vided by law.
The above-quoted portions of the Louisiana Constitution make it
clear that the only way for the State to alienate navigable water bottoms
is through a reclamation project to recover land that originally belonged
to the riparian owner, but which has now eroded into a navigable water
body. Additionally, it is black letter law that as private lands erode into
navigable water bodies, that new water bottom becomes the property of
the State.9
It is interesting to note that Louisiana courts, following U.S. Su-
preme Court precedent, have considered this right of reclamation "a leg-
islative donation which may be altered or controlled by the legislature."
Thus, although the Louisiana Constitution currently provides for a right
to reclamation, this right is not considered a right that is constitutionally
protected by the federal govemment" and could, theoretically, be done
91 The term "eroded land" is used in this paper as a term of art to refer to any property
that has submerged below the surface of a navigable water body, be it through erosion,
subsidence, or other means. The term "erosion" is also used as a general term of art to
refer to a broad swath of mechanisms by which property can become submerged below a
navigable water body.
9 La. C.C. Art. 450; A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, 2 LA. CIVIL L. TREATISE § 65, and
the authorities cited therein.
93 Cities Service Oil and Gas Corp. v. State, 574 So.2d 455, 460-461 (La.App. 2 Cir.
1991). See also, Jones v. Hogue, 129 So.2d 194 (La. 1960). The Cities Court relied on
Oregon er rel State Land Board v. Corvallis Sand and Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977)
for the proposition that no vested right would be disturbed by a state legislature changing
the rules related to riparian property, as state law governs issues relating to riparian prop-
erty, like other real property, 'unless some other principle of federal law requires a differ-
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away with by constitutional amendment in Louisiana. Although such a
scenario is unlikely, what these judicial interpretations do stand for is the
reality that the Legislature can change the rules on what the scope of the
rights are that are conferred pursuant to the right of reclamation at any
time without running much risk of violating constitutionally protected or
vested rights.
One situation in which the Legislature has dictated such rules is
with respect to La. R.S. 9:1151, commonly referred to as the "freeze sta-
tute." Mineral interests lying beneath such eroded property are subject to
the oil and gas lease freeze statute. This law provides that the mineral
rights held by the riparian owner at the time erosion occurs are retained
by the riparian owner for as long as existing mineral leases on that land
are in effect. Once these active leases are no longer in effect, the mineral
interests under the eroded land reverts to the current owner - the State.
Vice versa, if State-owned water bottoms on "rivers or other streams"
subject to a State mineral lease become privately-owned by virtue of ac-
cretion,9 7 the mineral interests under the accreted land reverts to the then-
current owner - the private landowner (during the life of the mineral
lease, however, the private landowner, or, as the case may be, the State,
would continue to receive the royalties on production).
Thus, a simple reading of La. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 3 in connection
with the freeze statute, leads to the impression that, once all active leases
have expired on eroded lands, the State owns both the eroded land and
the mineral rights thereunder (and since these laws cut both ways, former
State-owned navigable waters now-accreted-land, are owned, surface and
minerals, by the riparian private landowner). However, this truism,
which does work in most circumstances, must be tempered by the lan-
guage of La. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 4, which will be discussed more fully
below.
Basically, the freeze statute exists for the purpose of protecting par-
ties' contractual rights from the laws associated with changes in water
" This is based on the reality that, since the 1974 Louisiana Constitution was enacted,
Article IX, Sec. 3 provides the Legislature with the authority to impose conditions on and
create procedures for reclamation rights.
% La. R.S. 9:1151.
9 A useful definition of accretion comes from the Second Circuit:
Alluvion and accretion are terms used synonymously. Accretion is defined as the
act of growing to a thing; usually applied to the gradual and imperceptible accumu-
lation of land by natural causes, as out of the sea or river. Accretion is the addition
of portions of soil, by gradual deposition through the operation of natural causes, to
that already in possession of owner [sic]. The term alluvion is applied to the deposit
itself, while accretion denotes the act.
Walker Lands v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, 38,376 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/14/04) 871
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courses. As a river's course migrates, the ownership of the water bottom,
as a discrete piece of land, changes. The water bottom that emerges from
the moving river or stream, through the process of accretion, becomes
riparian land and changes its ownership status from State to private. On
the other hand, lands that were private, but are now submerged by the
changed water course, are converted to State ownership. In most cases,
this shifting of ownership equates to a quid pro quo: both the private ri-
parian landowner and the State gain and lose something. What the freeze
statute does is to protect existing mineral leases over such property from
being subject to this change in the status of surface ownership. 8 This law
effectively freezes everyone's mineral rights where they are at the time a
lease begins and insulates them from shifting surface rights (i.e., water or
land) for the duration of the lease.
There are some unique exceptions to the general principles dis-
cussed above. One revolves around who owns water bottoms when the
Corps of Engineers ("the Corps") or some other authority has cut a new
channel off of the main channel, thus making a new navigation or flow
channel. As a practical matter, this question gets as much at who owns
the minerals under the new channel as who can control access to the new
channel.
In general, when such new navigation or drainage channels are cut
pursuant to a written instrument of servitude in favor of the government,
the bottom of the newly created channel remains the private property of
the landowner, while the original channel, whether still connected to the
original channel or not, remains the public property of the State of Lou-
isiana." In such situations, the mineral rights underlying such properties
remain as they were before the channel was cut.
Access to the channel becomes a bit more complex. Because such
situations deal with essentially private property (i.e., the new channel), it
would not seem unreasonable, under the general rules of trespass, for the
private landowner to be able to limit or restrict access to the new channel
(i.e., the landowner's private property). However, a complicating fact in
this scenario is that the private channel has flowing through it "running
waters," which, under La. C.C. 450 are public things belonging to the
State.'" It is clear that it is impermissible to capture or stop the flow of
the running waters of this State, even if they traverse private property.
* Without the freeze statute, a mineral lessee would be put in an impossible practical
position to pay monthly royalties properly.
* Most such channel cuts are accomplished by securing a servitude from the private
landowners and are not expropriations or acquisitions of fee title. Even in situations of
expropriation, what is expropriated is still usually only a flow or drainage servitude. Also,
in cases like these, there is invariably some "public reason" for the cutting of the new
channel.
100 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, 2 LA. Civ. L. TREATISE § 57 (4th ed.).
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Because these situations do not impact matters related to the freeze stat-
ute, per se, they will be considered in a subsequent section of this paper.
Of course, the question that follows from the above discussion of
man-made cuts in a navigable river or stream is, what happens to the
ownership of the surface and the minerals when the original water course
in the area of a man-made cut dries up? In such situations, most of the
time, the original channel will become an oxbow lake before it disap-
pears entirely. Should an oxbow lake owned by the State dry up, this
property will remain in the ownership of the State, as the laws of accre-
tion do not apply to lakes.' 0' In such a situation, though now dry land, the
surface and mineral rights of this original channel - turned - oxbow lake
- turned - dry land, remain the property of the State.
When the formation of an oxbow lake does not result from the cut-
ting of a new channel, but the original channel nevertheless dries up,
what then becomes of the surface and mineral rights? The answer to this
question depends largely on the facts of each situation, as is discussed
below.
One example of this type of situation comes from a recent Attorney
General's opinion: La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 07-0030. In this situation, dur-
ing the 1980s, the Corps cut a channel along the Red River to improve
the flow of that waterway. The practical effect of creating this channel
was to create a straight-away in the River where a sharp curve had natu-
rally occurred. As the River was straightened the main flow largely
abandoned the natural curve, resulting in a silting-in of part or all of the
original bodies of water, possibly creating an oxbow lake.'0 2 In the area
of the cut, the Red River is (or was) unquestionably a navigable water-
way of the State. Thus, in a typical situation, notwithstanding agreements
to the contrary (such as a servitude), the State would be the owner of the
bottom of the Red River as it traverses the Corps channel.
Each such cut in water courses throughout the State presents a
unique set of facts. Thus, it is impossible to create a rule that will apply
to every channel around the State. Each channel was created based on
unique documents to acquire some interest in the property, each for a
particular purpose, each was created at a different time (meaning that as
the law changed over time, different rules applied to ownership), and the
hydrological and geological processes that acted upon the original chan-
nels after the cuts were made differ substantially from one cut to another
and are often incompletely documented. All of these factors make gener-
lot See, State v. Placid Oil Co., 300 So.2d 154 (La. 1974); see also, John L. Madden,
FEDERAL AND STATE LANDS IN LOUISIANA, 327-8 (Claitor's Publishing Division 1972).
102 In this opinion, it is stated that an oxbow lake was -possibly" created because the
factual information available at the time did not lead to a clear conclusion as to whether a
true oxbow existed in the area of the subject cut.
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alizations about the ownership of such channels impossible. However,
this paper is aimed at setting forth a series of processes for analyzing
such ownership under certain conditions.
In order to make a complete analysis of who owns what when an
artificial cut is made to a navigable waterway, the documents related to
that cut must be analyzed. As has been noted in numerous cases in this
State, whether an instrument purports to convey a servitude or fee title to
a party depends first on the ambiguity vel non inherent in the particular
document. 0 3
Under Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad
Co. ,'4 if there is no ambiguity in the document conveying an interest in
the particular property, extrinsic evidence cannot be considered and the
conveyance must be interpreted based on the language contained within
the four corners of the document.'05 If it is clear from the language of the
document that what was intended to be conveyed was a servitude, or,
conversely, a fee simple title, then no further inquiry can be made. If, on
the other hand, ambiguity does exist or an application of the instrument
as it is styled would lead to absurd consequences, extrinsic evidence may
be considered.' 6 Ambiguity may be inferred from such things as a dis-
proportionate price paid for the interest purported to be conveyed; a cap-
tion of the document that does not conform to the stated purposes in the
text; language in a servitude that grants the right "forever" or language in
a cash sale that grants the right "in perpetuity"; among other factors. In
addition, in cases where mineral interests are retained, there is a strong
argument that the servitude agreement was actually a transfer of fee title.
Such a reservation would be superfluous in a servitude. Once ambiguity
has been identified, the Porter court proposes the following question-
naire to determine whether an instrument is a servitude or a cash sale.
Our jurisprudence notes several factors which should be considered
when deciding whether fee title or a servitude has been conveyed ...
These factors include:
1. The consideration recited in the deed;
2. Whether a specific measurement was given to the "right-of-
way";
3. Whether the party claiming the fee title had an actual need for
such title;
103 See, Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., 127 So.2d 551
(La. App. 3 Cir.1961); Porter v. Acadia-Vermilion Irrigation Co., Inc., 479 So.2d 1003
(La. App. 3 Cir. 1985).
104 Id.
1os Id.
10 Porter, supra, n.103 at 1006.
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4. To whom the property was assessed and who paid the taxes on
the property;
5. Whether the grant was made for a specific purpose;
6. Whether the grant was made "in perpetuity" or "forever"; and,
7. How the parties to the conveyance, or their heirs and assigns,
have treated the property. 0 7
The ideas behind these factors are fairly straight-forward. If the con-
sideration in the instrument approaches the fair market value for the cost
of the property, that factor lends towards a finding of fee title. If specific
measurements were given to the property to be contained within the ser-
vitude or the right-of-way, this too lends towards a finding of fee title, as
exactness of property description is a hallmark of a sale. In cases involv-
ing channel cuts, the third factor above should always support the acqui-
sition of fee title. The acquiring entity will generally have a need for the
fee title, as the whole purpose of making the cut is to ensure the perpet-
ual flow of a waterway. It would seem nonsensical to acquire a servitude
for a channel that is anticipated to carry the waters of the State forever.
As to the fourth factor, if the original landowner continues to pay taxes
on the property, this lends to a finding that a servitude was granted. Fac-
tor five examines whether there was a specific purpose for the convey-
ance. It is unclear from Porter, but presumably if property were con-
veyed for a specific purpose and that purpose had an indefinite duration
(e.g., a channel cut), this factor would lend towards a finding of fee title.
As noted by the Porter court regarding the sixth factor, "a grant 'in per-
petuity' connotes only a limited grant, whereby a grant 'forever' con-
notes an unlimited grant and a sale in fee simple." 08 The final factor of-
ten dovetails back to factor four. It is often difficult to ascertain what the
intentions of the grantors were in such agreements. The payment of taxes
can provide some insight into what the grantors and their heirs or assigns
believed their interest in the property was. Also informative with respect
to this factor could be subsequent sales of the property which may or
may not mention a fee title interest to another party of the tract of land in
question, such as a "bounding owner", or the opposite, such as "bounded
by the right-of-way of [so-and-so]."
Should the language of a conveyance be ambiguous or lead to ab-
surd consequences, the above-noted inquiry should be undertaken to de-
termine whether a servitude or fee title has been acquired by the State
with respect to property used for channel cuts. The only way to be certain
about the interpretation of such contracts would be to obtain a declara-
tory judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction.
- 299 -
107 Porter, supra, n.103 at 1007.
108 Id. at 1008.
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In addition to the analysis of the documents dealing with the right to
cut channels, the law also provides some guidance as to who owns what,
depending on the facts. There are three possible outcomes for the owner-
ship of a silted-in old river channel, all of which are discussed more fully
below. The first scenario contemplates a situation whereby an oxbow
lake is formed where the old channel used to be. The second two possible
outcomes are legal distinctions of the same geomorphological phenome-
non. In these outcomes, which contemplate that no oxbow was created,
depending on when the cut was made and when the silting occurred,
there will be a difference of ownership of accretion based on a change in
the law in the late 1970s.
The simplest outcome would result from the silted channel forming
a traditional oxbow lake. It is well accepted that, once an oxbow forms
from the movement of a navigable water body, it becomes a lake in the
legal sense of the term. '" Thus, as with all navigable lakes in existence
prior to 1812, as the oxbow dries, the newly-dry land does not inure to
the ownership of the riparian landowners, but rather remains with the
State.o10 The question then becomes, when did the oxbow lake form? Ac-
cording to State v. Bourdon,"' if a navigable oxbow lake was formed
prior to statehood in 1812, it became the property of the State at state-
hood, and has remained as such since. However, navigable oxbows
formed since 1812 become, through indemnification," 2 the property of
the landowner whose property was inundated when the navigable water-
way that used to run through the oxbow channel moves to its new chan-
nel.
The Bourdon case presents a unique problem when considering arti-
ficial channels in Louisiana. Situations in which the Corps of Engineers
or other entity has created an artificial cut in a navigable waterway, thus
creating a new main channel of that waterway, are not contemplated by
the laws related to water bottom ownership and accretion in the Louisi-
ana Civil Code." 3 In most of these cases, the Corps or other entity does
not purchase the property underlying the new channel outright. Rather, it
obtains a servitude from the landowner and proceeds to reroute the water
'" See, A.N. Yiannopoulas, Property, LA. CIv. L. TREATISE, Vol. 2, 4th ed., § 76
(West 2001). Just because a navigable portion of a river or stream becomes a lake in the
legal sense of the term does not necessarily mean that the ownership of that new water
body remains with the State - this scenario is detailed in the succeeding text.
Io See, State v. Placid, supra, for a discussion of the inapplicability of the law of ac-
cretion to lakes; see also, La. C.C. Art 500.
" 535 So.2d 1091 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1988).
112 The indemnification referred to here is the indemnification contemplated in La.
C.C. Art. 504.
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through this formerly dry property. This scenario is substantially differ-
ent from the law on the ownership of water bottoms when a natural (even
if abetted or accelerated by the act of man) change in the course of a na-
vigable waterway occurs. 1 14 Under that general law, the State takes own-
ership of the newly-inundated water bottom and the landowner whose
land has disappeared beneath the water takes by indemnification from the
abandoned bed of the waterway.
However, in situations where there is a clear servitude that grants
the Corps or other entity the right to make the cut, the State does not gain
an ownership interest in the newly-inundated water bottom due to the
existence of the servitude (subject to a finding that the servitude is, in
fact and in law, a servitude and not a transfer of fee title). Accordingly,
the landowner has not lost his now-inundated property and, indeed, he
was compensated for its use as a waterway. In such situations, there is no
indemnification owed. The landowner retains ownership of and minerals
beneath the channel cut and the State retains ownership of and minerals
beneath the original water bottom.
Although the laws of accretion, in the traditional sense of accretion,
may apply to the such a situation, it seems that, for reasons of equity, the
original channel of a navigable waterway must be treated somewhat dif-
ferently when the landowner retains ownership of the newly-created wa-
ter bottom. These laws are intended to return land to the stream of com-
merce as it emerges from the bottoms of State water bodies. However,
again, the Civil Code articles related to accretion,' 15 which are based on
ancient French and Roman laws," do not contemplate the massive
earth-moving works of the modem Corps of Engineers.
In situations in which the original path of a navigable river or other
stream did not accrete by natural forces, but rather were filled in as a di-
rect result of anthropogenic factors and, unlike the more ancient tradi-
tional situation, the State did not obtain an interest in the newly formed
water bottom, a certain inequity would exist to the citizens of Louisiana
if the State were not allowed to retain some of the property involved.' 17
"1 La. C.C. Arts. 502 and 504.
us La. C.C. Arts. 499-501.
116 See, A.N. Yiannopoulas, Property, LA. Civ. L. TREATISE, Vol. 3, 4th ed., § 49.
1' The inequity referred to here is based on the scenario where a Corps channel is cut
pursuant to a servitude - meaning that the State does not have an ownership interest in
the new water bottom - and the general laws of accretion come into play on the former
channel. In this instance, the State would lose its interest in the former bed, assuming that
accretion did in fact occur, but would gain no interest through indemnification as to the
new channel because of the servitude. This situation, on the river or other stream, is vast-
ly different from that contemplated by the Civil Code in Article 504 and would cause an
inequity to the citizens of the State in that property would be lost with no correlative gain
as envisioned by the Civil Code. Thus, the citizens stand to lose the benefits that inure to
the State by virtue of the ownership of a navigable water bottom.
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As a result of this inequity, so long as an original channel of such a navi-
gable waterway remains inundated (as with an oxbow lake or via a direct
opening to the new channel), that property remains with the State and the
only way for the adjacent landowners to gain an interest in the property
is through the law of accretion.
Thus, unlike the general rule that, once formed, a navigable oxbow
lake created post-1812 becomes the property of the private landowner, 18
when the oxbow is formed as a result of an artificial cut in which the
State gains no interest in the new channel, ownership of the old water
bottom remains with the State and can only be lost through the law of
accretion. If the oxbow becomes a lake in the true sense of the word (i.e.,
cut off from the old channel at both ends), the law of accretion does not
apply,"'9 and the dried water bottom remains the property of the State. If
the old river channel at issue, in whole or in part, formed an oxbow lake
and that lake, navigable-in-fact and thus navigable-in-law, has, over
time, dried up, then the bed of that portion of the channel that was the
oxbow lake belongs to the State. In any case, all minerals underneath a
dried oxbow lake would similarly remain in the ownership of the State.
For the other two outcomes it must be assumed, arguendo, that a
channel is legally considered a river or a stream and not a lake. This sce-
nario thus contemplates a situation whereby an oxbow lake is not formed
by the movement of silt into the old channel. The ownership distinction
between these outcomes is made based on the actual time at which the
cut was made. The reason for this is that the Civil Code articles related to
accretion to islands were changed in 1978.120 This is relevant because
most such cuts effectively create, at least for a time, an island within the
stream of the navigable waterway.
If a channel cut was begun before the changes to the Code, some or
all of the silt that accreted to the island would inure to the State, while
the accretion on the other bank (the nonisland side of the channel) would
inure to the riparian owner. This follows from the theory that accretion,
in the strict legal sense of the term, cannot occur to islands under the ap-
plicable pre-1978 Civil Code articles.121
However, if a channel cut was made after the Code was changed, it
appears likely that all of the accretion, whether on the island side or the
nonisland side of the channel, would inure to the riparian landowners.
... See generally, State v. Bourdon, supra, n. Il .
119 La. C.C. Art. 500.
120 La. C.C. Arts. 456, 499, and 665 (former articles 455, 509, and 665).
121 Andrew J.S. Jumonville, Accretion in the Atchafalaya Basin: Present and Future
Title Controversies, Presentation to the Louisiana Mineral Law Institute, 1974 at 19-21.
This is because under the pre-1978 Code articles, islands were incapable of having
"banks" as then defined in the Civil Code.
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Thus, any area of a silted-in channel that was not once a true oxbow lake,
for channelization occurring after the Civil Code was revised in 1978,
accretion becomes the private property of the riparian landowners. In
such a case, the State loses. All of these issues are of significant impor-
tance when attempting to determine who a landowner is when a particu-
lar lease is sought.
In addition to the issues related to who owns what when artificial
cuts are made to the navigable waterways of the State, other significant
issues related to the freeze statute are those surrounding the loss of the
State's coastline. As the coast erodes, the newly submerged land be-
comes State water bottom. Generally, the minerals go with the land.
However, because of the freeze statute, if mineral leases exist over this
property, the mineral rights will remain with the original landowner for
so long as the lease exists. When the lease terminates, the mineral rights
accrue to the State.
V. Of Access Rights and Liability
Other issues related to ownership of man-made canals and cuts have
arisen in recent years. Many of these revolve around liability for injuries
that occur in such channels. Because these issues relate to the above dis-
cussion of the rights to minerals lying underneath such channels and be-
cause these liability issues are important to those of you practicing in the
private sector, a review of these issues is warranted.
As a general premise, Yiannopoulos states that,
[aiccording to Article 450 of the Louisiana Civil Code, running wa-
ter is a public thing. As such, it is owned by the state in its capacity
as a public person and it is subject to public use.12 2
Thus, it is axiomatic that the general public has a right to access
running water in the State of Louisiana. However, several cases have
narrowed this broad generalization.
The most important of these cases is Buckskin Hunting Club v.
Bayard.123 In this case, the Third Circuit held that certain pipeline canals
in the Atchafalaya Basin were not susceptible of the public use tenet pro-
vided for in the Civil Code.124 This is not a surprising result, as it is also
well settled that private canals constructed with private funds, even if
navigable, are not defacto subject to a public use.' 5 The Buckskin canals
m2 A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, 2 LA. Civ. L. TREATISE, § 57 (4th ed.) (footnotes
omitted).
123 2003-1428 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/04) 868 So.2d 266.
124 Id. at 275.
125 Id. at 274-275.
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were made for the purpose of supporting hydrocarbon transport through
pipelines. These canals were dug on private land 26 with private funds.
Also of interest with respect to this matter is People for Open Wa-
ters, Inc. v. Estate of J. G. Gray.127 This case dealt with a canal wholly
constructed on private land where the landowner was concerned with
problems such as litter and bank erosion, among other things.'2 8 The
Third Circuit here also found that the public did not have a defacto right
of use to this canal simply because it is navigable-in-fact and because it
captures the flow of waters of the State. Interestingly, the court in Gray
noted that
we find no validity to the assumption that because the water in the
canal is a public thing, the public must have a right to use the ca-
nal. 129
The court stated that the only thing, in this case, that the landowner
was obligated to do was to ensure that the flow of the waterway was not
diminished as it traversed his property. Nowhere did the court state that
this use of public waters required an opening of the otherwise private
canal to the public. Additionally, as with Buckskin, the channel in Gray
was a channel constructed for specific commercial purposes.
In Cenac v. Public Access Water Rights Association,'30 the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court dealt with the public's right to access a boat launch
and a privately-owned canal in Lafourche Parish. In this case, members
of the public argued that historic use of these things equated to a dedica-
tion of their use to the public and that the current landowner could not
now restrict public access. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of
the landowner as to the boat launch, but in favor of the public as to the
use of the canal. The appellate court affirmed the ruling on the boat
launch, but also stated the canal was not available for public access. The
Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling, rejecting all of the
"dedication to the public use" arguments.
This case established a high burden for parties claiming that a dedi-
cation to public use had been established. The Court held that historic
access was not enough to prove such a dedication. It stated that because
those seeking access had failed to prove a plain and positive intent to
126 It should be pointed out that at one point in the Buckskin case, there were some
State owned lands at issue as well as some contested lands. However, those lands were
not the subjects of the holding in the case. Only the private lands were the subjects of the
holding.
127 94-301 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/5/94) 643 So.2d 415.
m2 Id. at 416.
129 Id. at 418.
130 2002-2660 (La. 6/27/03) 851 So.2d 1006.
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dedicate by language or acts so clear as to exclude every other hypothesis
but that kind of dedication, there was no implied dedication to public use.
In the recent Third Circuit case, Schoeffler v. Drake Hunting
Club,'3 1 the issue in dispute was whether citizens of the State had a right
to access water bodies within patented lands. The facts are fairly straight
forward: A group of citizens brought an action against several landown-
ers in the Atchafalaya Basin who had posted no trespassing signs and
barriers on waters within the Basin. In contrast to some of the canal ac-
cess cases, this case related to waters that were subject to the tidal over-
flow in the Atchafalaya Basin. The citizens basically argued that they
should have access to these waters because the waters were part of the
"waters of the State", which are open to public use. Like the canal access
cases, for the purposes of mineral law, cases such as this, should access
be allowed, raise issues of liability for landowners (including the State)
should injuries occur thereon and for operators whose equipment may
cause injuries or damage if it is hit or otherwise involved in a harmful
incident by members of the public.
In addition, in their fourth amended petition, the Plaintiffs named
the State as a party-Defendant, seeking an order for the State to survey
the entire Basin and set boundaries throughout based on the high-water
mark. The Third Circuit did not take kindly to the Plaintiffs' position. It
affirmed the trial court's ruling that dismissed all claims against the
State. The Court noted several times the extreme difficulties in accom-
plishing what the Plaintiffs were requesting:
Nonetheless, Plaintiffs seek to combine traditional boundary articles
with La.Civ.Code art. 456, and force the State and the private own-
ers to fix numerous boundaries based on numerous bodies of water.
Plaintiffs concede the inundated nature of the swamp land at issue,
and therefore in reality seek to establish a boundary, not between
contiguous lands, but between the water flowing onto private land
and the navigable waters of the State of Louisiana.' 32
The Plaintiffs claimed to be proper parties to bring such a boundary
action because, as they claimed, they are "usufructuaries" since "they
have the right to enjoy the use and fruits of State-owned waters and bot-
toms."' 3 3 The court rejected this argument. The Court stated that the au-
thorities cited by the Plaintiffs did not establish a usufructuary interest in
the waters and flooded areas of the Basin on behalf of the public-at-large.
The Court additionally found that the Plaintiffs were improper par-
ties to bring a boundary action. 134 If these waters were State-owned,
131 2005-499 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/4/06) 919 So.2d 822.
132 Id. at 831.
13 Id. at 832.
134 Id. at 834.
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then, said the Court, the State would be the proper party to bring a boun-
dary action.'13 The Court also noted the extreme difficulty and expense
should the State choose to bring such actions. It stated that this virtually
impossible task would require separate actions against each landowner
with the unique facts of each piece of property controlling the outcome.
Due to the ephemeral nature of much of the Basin, the Court felt that
such claims would be a waste of resources, as the facts could change
from day-to-day.
In Schoeffler, the court also rejected the Plaintiffs' argument that
they had acquired an interest in the water bodies through historic and
traditional use. It stated that:
We cannot avoid the observation that where one owner of long ago
may have invited the public to fish and hunt his land, a modem
owner may be less generous, or more concerned with liability asso-
ciated with free access, or obligated to his lessors who pay for the
privilege of access. The argument that a thing has "always" been
done, does not provide a cause or right of action. 36
Thus, as these cases demonstrate, the courts have generally upheld
the private nature of waterways on strictly private land and the right to
control access thereto.' 37 As noted above, this fairly consistent holding
bodes well for operators on private property, as claims for damages are
mitigated by trespass issues. However, determining what constitutes a
private waterway is often a fiercely fought battle between the State and
private landowners.' 38 This topic is, however, outside of the scope of this
paper.
VI. Of the Inalienability of Minerals
It is a general tenet of Louisiana law that when a private party trans-
fers property to the State and expressly reserves its mineral rights, La.
13s Id.
116 Id. at 840.
17 The federal courts have somewhat differed from the State courts in this regard. See
e.g., Parm v. Shumate, 513 F.3d 135 (C.A. 5 2007), writs denied, 129 S.Ct. 42 (2008);
see also, Parm v. Shumate, 2006 WL 2513856 (W.D.La. 2006) (Because the Court was
satisfied that the plaintiffs in this case only wanted access to the water that overflowed
this area during flood stages and did not want access to the dry land, such would be a
permissible use of State waters. The Court found this right to be supported by common
law and state law. Thus, so long as the public stayed within the ordinary high water stage
of the river, access was permissible.). Interestingly, the Parm case related to the same
land that the State lost in Walker Lands, infra. See also, Meche v. Richard, 2007 WL
634154 (W.D.La. 2007) (holding, that Lake Rycade is navigable-in-fact for the purposes
of applying admiralty law - no decision has yet been reached on the actual ownership).
138 See e.g., Walker Lands v. East Carroll Parish Police Jury, 38,376 (La.App. 2 Cir.
4/14/04) 871 So.2d 1258; writs denied, 2004-1421 (La. 6/3/05) 903 So.2d 442.
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R.S. 31:149 permits this reservation to be virtually perpetual.139 The res-
ervation should be considered virtually perpetual, because if the State (or
one of its agencies) were to keep the property forever, the reservation
would last forever. However, should the State ever divest itself of the
property to a private entity, the reservation of mineral rights ceases to be
perpetual and the reservation of such rights provided for in La. R.S.
31:16 and A1:85 takes effect. 40 Thus, when transferring immoveable
property in Louisiana, there is a distinct advantage to private sellers
wishing to expressly reserve mineral rights by transferring to the State
rather than to another private individual: they get to retain their mineral
rights virtually indefinitely. One maajor policy behind this advantage is to
promote the donation of surface rights for the conservation and preserva-
tion of, among other things, wildlife habitats, ecologically important or
sensitive areas, or historic and archaeological resources; to encourage the
selling of same to a government or governmental agency or subdivision;
or, in the case of expropriation or condemnation, to perhaps limit the ve-
hemence of the private landowner's defense.
Since 1921, this situation also exists when the surface property goes
the other way: from the State to a private party. Pursuant to La. Const.
Art. IX, Sec. 4(A), if the State divests itself of property, the mineral
rights thereunder are reserved to the State and they cannot be alien-
ated.141 There are, however, a few nuances to this reservation that are
essential to understand.
" La. R.S. 31:149, which is part of the Mineral Code (effective Jan. 1, 1975), contin-
ues earlier statutes permitting such a retention that would apply to property sold to the
State prior to the adoption of the Mineral Code. As noted in the 2000 comments to La.
R.S. 31:149:
Articles 149 through 152 are a revision of former La.R.S. 9:5806 (1950, as
amended 1960). Paragraph A of La.R.S. 9:5806 was in essence Act 315 of 1940,
which dealt with situations in which land is deeded to or expropriated by the United
States or any of its agencies or subdivisions. Paragraph B was added by Act 278 of
1958, as amended by Act 528 of 1960; it dealt with similar situations where the
land is acquired by certain listed categories of state agencies and subdivisions.
140 See however, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0215, FN 10, for one possible exception
for a brief span of time. The general mineral reservation as between private parties is
effective for ten years. La. R.S. 31:16 and 31:85. However, should the minerals subject to
the reservation actually be in production at the tolling of the ten-year period, the reserva-
tion remains in force until such time as the production ceases. La. R.S. 31:87, et seq.
Furthermore, as to minerals (though not as to royalties) the good faith drilling of a dry
hole interrupts the tolling of prescription and commences it anew for ten years.
1' This reservation is limited in two situations, the first is explicitly presented in La.
Const. Art. IX, Sec. 4(A), thus:
except when the owner or person having the right to redeem buys or redeems prop-
erty sold or adjudicated to the state for taxes.
The second relates to coastal restoration efforts and is discussed in more detail infra.
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Many private landowners in Louisiana obtained their property from
the State of Louisiana at some point in time. If a landowner acquired the
subject property from the State before 1921, then he likely owns the
minerals. 42 However, due to a constitutional change in 1921, if a land-
owner or his ancestor in title acquired the subject property from the State
post-1921, then he never acquired any of the minerals. 4 1 The 1921 Lou-
isiana Constitution created a restriction against divesting State-owned
mineral rights even if the State sells the surface rights to a piece of prop-
erty, therefore vesting in the State a perpetual mineral interest (since pre-
scription does not run against the State).'" Thus, if a landowner or his
ancestor in title purchased his property from the State post-1921, the in-
quiry stops here. The State owned the minerals at the time of the sale and
continued to own them after the sale, and no subsequent landowner has
any interest in the minerals at any point in their ownership of the prop-
erty. Accordingly, any reservations of such mineral rights by private par-
ties in their conveyance documents would be null ab initio. However, if a
present landowner or his ancestor in title acquired from an entity other
than the State or acquired from the State pre-1921, then he could quite
likely hold the minerals underlying his property.145
As noted above, one of the complex nuances of the State's perpetual
reservation of its minerals relates to the timing of the sale of the State
property at issue. In many cases, in the nineteenth century, the govern-
ment erred in granting certain land patents. In those situations, the holder
of a patent was entitled to present it to the General Land Office (the pre-
cursor to the Bureau of Land Management) for a lieu warrant that could
later be "cashed in" for a patent on a different piece of property. Several
cases have addressed what rights are acquired with the issuance of these
documents and the timing of when the warrants are presented to the gov-
ernment agency for honoring.
142 This would also apply if the landowner's ancestor in title acquired the property
from the State pre-1921. However, this scenario does not necessarily apply to situations
in which a lieu warrant is issued by the State prior to 1921 and the warrant is not "cashed-
in" until after 1921. This scenario is discussed more fully in the text infra.
14 See, La. Const. 1921 Art. IV, Sec. 2. Interestingly, very few landowners realize this
reality. Often, post-1921-acquired private landowners purport to transfer or reserve min-
eral interests as they sell property acquired from the State post-1921. See e.g., La. Atty.
Gen. Op. No. 08-0212. In such situations, such transfers, reservations, or other references
to the minerals being owned by anyone other than the State are null and void. Id.
'4 It is important to note in this regard (unlike the private landowner) that there need
be no express reservation of such rights in a sale by the State. Because this restriction is
mandated by constitutional flat, silence on the reservation of minerals in a sale post-1921
does not act as a transfer of those rights. See, Lewis v. State, 156 So.2d 431 (La. 1963);
see also, La. Atty. Gen. Op. Nos. 08-0212; 79-1000; 1969, p.132. It is also important to
note that this restriction was continued by the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. La. Const.
Art. IX, Sec. 4.
145 Subject to the lieu warrant and patent issuance discussed infra.
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It is generally accepted that a lieu warrant (which is sometimes re-
ferred to as a "land warrant") creates an inchoate right to some unspeci-
fied property at some unspecified point in time. 146 Thus, if a landowner
or his ancestor in title acquired a lieu warrant from the General Land Of-
fice, he acquired a right to later petition the State for the selection of a
parcel of land.14 7 The courts have held that swapping a defective patent
for a lieu warrant does not convey to the holder of the lieu warrant any
rights in a particular, specific tract of land that may have vested under the
traded-in defective patent. 148 Nonetheless, the courts have also held that a
properly issued warrant that was presented for a patent prior to 1921
permits the warrant holder to acquire both some specific tract of land and
the minerals thereunder.149
A confusing situation presents itself when a warrant is submitted to
the State for the selection of land after 1921. The reason for this is that,
in 1921, as noted above, the law related to the alienability of minerals
was substantially changed when the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 was
adopted by the voters of the State. For the first time, the Louisiana Con-
stitution contained a perpetual, imprescriptible mineral reservation vested
in the State that attached to the minerals lying beneath lands sold by the
State. The relevant provision provides, in pertinent part,
In all cases the mineral rights on any and all property sold by the
State shall be reserved, except where the owner or other person hav-
ing the right to redeem may buy or redeem property sold or adjudi-
cated to the State for taxes.'50
Thus, any land that was sold by the State subsequent to the passage
of the 1921 Constitution would be subject to the mandated, reserved
State perpetual, imprescriptible mineral reservation discussed above. The
problem for warrant holders whose warrants predate 1921 but who do
not present the warrant for a patent until after 1921 is that, per Douglas v.
State,' the rights in the subject property only vest once the lieu warrant
is presented to the State Land Office. Accordingly, the State could not,
by constitutional mandate, transfer the mineral rights along with the
property when such landowners cashed-in their lieu warrants post-1921.
146 See, Hyman's Heirs v. Grace, I So.2d 683, 686 (La. 1941) ("The Act, under which
the lieu warrant involved herein was issued, contemplates a future location of the warrant
on lands of like character belonging to the State without designating any particular time
within which it can be done.").
1'4 Id.
n Lewis, supra, n.144 at 433.
149 See generally, Hyman's Heirs, supra, n. 146.
'" La. Const. 1921, Art. IV, Sec. 2. This same provision, in virtually identical lan-
guage, was also incorporated into the 1974 Constitution at La. Const. 1974 Art. IX, Sec.
4.
1s1 23 So.2d 279 (La. 1945).
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Unfortunately, there is no law directly in point on this matter. 152
There are three lead cases that discuss who owns what in lieu warrant
situations. Both Hyman's Heirs v. Grace and Douglas, are informative,
but do not consider the exact scenario discussed above. Both of these
cases deal with lieu warrants that were presented to the Land Office prior
to 1921. In Douglas, the Louisiana Supreme Court clearly stated when
the rights of full ownership attach to a lieu warrant.
[W]hen an entryman complies with the appropriate statute and does
everything required thereby, as she has done in this case, equitable
title vests immediately, although the execution of the necessary
documents to convey legal title is delayed. Applying this principle
to the instant case she maintains that for all practical purposes the
property herein involved became hers on February 19, 1919, or if
not then, on February 3, 1939, the date of the renewal of her original
application. 5 3
The Court further noted that,
when the plaintiff applied for the patent in 1919 and renewed the
same in 1939, her right thereto became perfect and complete and she
thereby acquired a vested right to the property the same as if the pa-
tent had issued, entitling her to all revenues derived therefrom. 154
In both Douglas and Hyman's Heirs, the problem addressed by the
court was the Land Office's failure to complete the ministerial duties
associated with acting on lieu warrants presented to it prior to the pas-
sage of the 1921 Constitution. Such is not the case in the above scenario.
In this hypothetical scenario, although the lieu warrant was issued prior
to 1921, it was not presented to the Land Office until some time thereaf-
ter. Thus, there was no ministerial duty to perform in this matter for
which Douglas and Grace would control.
In the case of Lewis v. State, both the lieu warrant and the patent
were issued after 1921. The Supreme Court in that case rejected the Hy-
man 's Heirs and Douglas dicta to the extent that they conferred some
interest in the minerals based upon the defective patent that the lieu war-
rant was intended to remedy.' 5 This case clearly recognized that the is-
suance of a lieu warrant and patent post-1921 could not convey any min-
152 One case was presented to the Louisiana Supreme Court (twice) whose facts are
identical to those presented in the scenario presented herein. In Albritton v. Grace, 96
So.2d 565 (La. 1957), and Albritton v. Moore, 116 So.2d 502, (La. 1959), the Supreme
Court was presented with a lieu warrant issued in 1919 and a request for a patent to be
issued in the 1950s. The matter was remanded both times on technical problems, thus
meaning that the Supreme Court never ruled on the merits.
153 Douglas, supra, n.151 at 654.
'm Id. at 663.
155 Lewis, supra, n. 144 at 433.
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eral interests to the presenter of the warrant. 156 Further, the Court noted
that,
[i]n our opinion, Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution of 1921 is
clearly applicable to this conveyance. The section is mandatory. It
applies to all sales of land, whereby the state divests itself of title,
with one exception: the redemption of property adjudicated to the
state for taxes. V
Most importantly however, the Court emphatically stated that,
[w]e conclude that the state patent is null, void, and of no effect as
to mineral rights and that these rights are owned by the State of
Louisiana. 5 8
Although the Lewis case strongly suggests that no mineral interests
are conveyed with a patent issued post-1921, the Louisiana courts have
not directly addressed the question of whether a lieu warrant issued be-
fore 1921 but not presented until after 1921 would result in the holder of
the warrant owning the minerals when they cash it in. However, it is ap-
parent that, considering the totality of what is relevant from the Hyman 's
Heirs, Douglas, and Lewis cases, it is unlikely that such landowners
would have a valid claim to the minerals.
In the absence of a definitive answer on this issue from the jurispru-
dence, it also seems appropriate to analogize a lieu warrant to a contract
for sale in Louisiana. In order for a sale to be perfected in Louisiana, La.
C.C. Art. 2457 states that,
[w]hen the object of a sale is a thing that must be individualized
from a mass of things of the same kind, ownership is transferred
when the thing is thus individualized according to the intention of
the parties.
Indeed, the jurisprudence related to La. C.C. Art. 2457 contemplates
precisely the problem presented herein:
According to the Louisiana Civil Code, when the thing to be sold is
part of a greater like mass and thus uncertain and unidentified, the
first prerequisite is not satisfied, and, therefore, the contract of sale
is not perfected. Instead, the contract is executory, or otherwise
called a contract to sell. 59
Thus, the lieu warrant essentially represents a receipt for the selec-
tion of a certain class of land from all of the lands held by the State. The
15 Id.
' Id. at 434.
'm Id. In such a situation, this State ownership of minerals does not prohibit the private
party from owning the surface.
1 In re Evangeline Refining Co., Inc., 37 B.R. 450, 453 (Bktrcy. La. 1984); see also,
George D. Wit Shoe Co. v. J.A. Seegars & Co., 47 So. 444, 446 (1908).
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warrant references something that "is part of a greater like mass" that is
not actually individualized until the warrant is presented to the Land Of-
fice for the selection of the specifically described lands and the issuance
of a patent thereon.
Another important matter related to inalienability dovetails from the
discussion of the freeze statute, supra. This matter relates to what is to be
done with the minerals attributable to lands reclaimed from coastal ero-
sion.
Coastal land loss through erosion is nothing new to the residents of
South Louisiana.'so It is a harsh reality that our coastline is disappearing
into the Gulf of Mexico at an alarming rate due to both natural and an-
thropogenic factors.' 6 1 In an effort to slow, or perhaps even stem, this
process, the Legislature and the people of the State have, over time, add-
ed numerous laws to the books. Among those provisions is Section 4 to
Article IX of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. Portions of this Section
establish the respective rights of the State and riparian owners with re-
spect to minerals once the surface has become a navigable water body.
Section 4 provides, as a default scenario, that when formerly submerged
lands emerge, the State shall reserve the mineral rights under the re-
claimed land. However, Section 4 also contemplates that this emergent
land'62 can, by contract between the State and the riparian owner, have a
different mineral ownership scheme than the default. According to the
procedures established by law, which must be in harmony with other
constitutional and statutory provisions, the State may reassign certain
mineral interests lying beneath eroded lands. Act 626 of the 2006 Regu-
lar Session of the Louisiana Legislature, discussed more fully below, is
one of these laws that provides for the establishment of alternative (i.e.,
non-default, non-State) ownership of mineral rights following reclama-
tion.
As a general rule, when land is expropriated by the State, the origi-
nal landowner may retain a perpetual mineral servitude for so long as the
property is in the possession of the State.'63 However, this general rule
16o See generally, Seidemann, supra, n.78.
161 See generally, Ryan M. Seidemann and Catherine D. Susman, Wetlands Conserva-
tion in Louisiana: Voluntary Incentives and Other Alternatives, 17 J. ENVTL. L. & LIT.
441 (2002).
162 It should be noted that the status of land as being "emergent" determines the legal
rights attached to that land. In other words, emergent land is singled out for special treat-
ment by the law of Louisiana because of its classification as "emergent" and the public
benefits that stem from land reclamation. Accordingly, when the land is no longer "emer-
gent" (i.e., it once again becomes submerged beneath a navigable water body), it loses its
"emergent" classification and the special treatment attached thereto.
163 La. R.S. 31:149. It should be noted that this provision of the Mineral Code applies
not only to State expropriation, but to property expropriated by any "expropriating au-
thority." See, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 07-0147. See also, La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 08-0215,
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does not apply to eroded lands. Once eroded and, if applicable, at the
termination of mineral leases protected by the freeze statute, the mineral
interests become one with the newly created water bottoms of navigable
waterways, making all surface and subsurface mineral interests the prop-
erty of the State in its sovereign capacity.16 The point of this discussion
is simple: the reservation of mineral rights by landowners provided for in
the Mineral Code does not necessarily apply to situations of eroded
lands.
Act 626 of the Louisiana Legislature's 2006 Regular Session
amended and reenacted La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a). Its stated purposes
included granting the Secretary of the Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") the authority to enter into agreements
concerning the acquisition of land by certain entities for coastal pro-
jects ... to provide for the adoption of rules and regulations [to facili-
tate these ends, and] to provide relative to agreements concerning
ownership of minerals ...
Basically, Act 626 falls into line with the other laws of recent vin-
tage aimed at slowing or stemming the land loss problems of coastal
Louisiana. It attempts to achieve this goal by providing for expanded
powers that the State can use to implement its reclamation plans. More
specifically, though, Act 626 attempts to provide a mechanism to resolve
ownership issues with respect to reclaimable property, with its key in-
gredient being the preservation of the State's right of access to such
property to maintain its coastal protection and restoration projects.
Many of the mineral provisions of this Act and those contained in
the already-existing La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) exist to ensure than
mineral interests will not interfere with the primary purpose of reclaim-
ing eroded lands to facilitate coastal restoration and protection, and en-
courages the cooperation of the private landowner - if needed or desired
- in any such reclamation project. Act 626 does not, however, materially
alter the existing law regarding the ownership of minerals on State water
bottoms or eroded lands. Subject to that caveat, a review of the effects of
that law are important. Before embarking on such a review, an analysis
of the amended language of the law is necessary. Louisiana Revised Sta-
tute 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) states that:
To facilitate the development, design, and implementation of coastal
conservation, restoration and protection plans and projects, includ-
ing hurricane protection and flood control, pursuant to R.S. 49:214.1
et seq., the secretary of the Department of Natural Resources may
enter into agreements with owners of land contiguous to and abut-
note 10, for the possible exception for particular times in 1990 through 1991.
'" La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 81-274.
16s Act 626 of 2006, preamble.
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ting navigable water bottoms belonging to the state who have the
right to reclaim or recover such land, including all oil and gas min-
eral rights, as provided in Subsection B of this Section, which
agreements may establish in such owner the perpetual, transferrable
ownership of all subsurface mineral rights to the then existing coast
or shore line. Such agreements may also provide for a limited or
perpetual alienation or transfer, in whole or in part, to such owner
of subsurface mineral rights owned by the state relating to the
emergent lands that emerge from waterbottoms that are subject to
such owner's right of reclamation in exchange for the owner's com-
promise of his ownership and reclamation rights within such area
and for such time as the secretary deems appropriate and in further
exchange for the owner's agreement to allow his existing property to
be utilized in connection with the project to the extent deemed nec-
essary by the secretary.66
Immediately upon reading La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i), the ques-
tion of "is there a constitutional prohibition against granting private lan-
downers perpetual mineral interests to land that can erode and become
State water bottoms by operation of law?" arises. What this question as-
sumes is that Act 626 appears to provide for the creation of perpetual
mineral servitudes, but what becomes of such servitudes when the land
over which they are granted re-erodes into the Gulf of Mexico and once
again becomes State water bottom?
The language of La. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 3, when combined with La.
C.C. Art. 450 is clear: as land erodes into navigable waterways, it be-
comes the property of the State, along with its underlying minerals.167
Neither Act 626 nor La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) conflict with this man-
date. As to emergent lands, the law is now clear:
agreements [between the State and the riparian owner] may ... pro-
vide for a limited or perpetual alienation or transfer, in whole or in
part, to such owner of subsurface mineral rights owned by the state
... that are subject to such owner's right of reclamation ...
In other words, the State has the option to transfer back to the ripar-
ian owner the mineral interests under emergent lands. In order for such a
transfer to be constitutional under the mandates of La. Const. Art. IX,
Sec. 3 and La. C.C. Art. 450, the term "perpetual" as used in Act 626 and
La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a) must be interpreted as referring to the perpet-
ual life of the emergent land.169 If and when that emergent land again
16 La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
167 See, A.N. Yiannopoulos, Property, 2 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE § 65. All of this is sub-
ject to the reservations of the freeze statute.
16 La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
169 Note that this interpretation must be applied to all land covered within the scope of
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erodes into a navigable waterway, the life of that land has expired and so
too would any agreement for a perpetual interest in the underlying min-
erals.'o
This interpretation of Act 626 is based on two factors. First, the lan-
guage of La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i) specifically states that the agree-
ment transferring the mineral interests of emergent lands from the State
to the riparian owner is tied to the classification of that land as emergent.
Thus, it is only logical to conclude that, once the land is no longer emer-
gent (i.e., it has re-eroded into a navigable waterway) the authority of the
State to transfer those rights evaporates. Second, and more importantly, it
is apparent that La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a) was constructed to avoid the
prohibition in La. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(A) against the donation of
State assets. Specifically, the law states that the mineral rights may be
granted back to the riparian owner
... in exchange for the owner's compromise of his ownership and
reclamation rights within such area and for such time as the secre-
tary deems appropriate and in further exchange for the owner's
agreement to allow his existing property to be utilized in connection
with the project to the extent deemed necessary by the secretary.17'
In other words, pursuant to La. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 3, riparian own-
ers have the right to reclaim eroded lands on their own. In exchange for
allowing the State to exercise this private right and then to intrude on this
private property for the purposes of coastal restoration and protection
projects, the State will grant certain mineral interests to the riparian own-
er. In essence, what the law establishes is a process for the State to enter
into cooperative endeavor agreements with the riparian owners under La.
Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(C). Such agreements allow the State to "donate"
certain rights - in this case mineral rights - in exchange for something of
value that furthers a public purpose - in this case the right to enter and
use private land for coastal restoration and protection. This quid pro quo
is absolutely necessary for the State's grant of mineral rights to be consti-
tutional. Accordingly, if and when the emergent land re-erodes, the quid
pro quo is gone: the State can no longer access private property for
coastal restoration and protection purposes, absent, of course, a later rec-
lamation agreement with the private riparian landowner. When this re-
erosion occurs, the constitutional basis, the quid pro quo, for the "dona-
tion" of the mineral rights ceases to exist and those rights revert to the
La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a). To do otherwise would lead to a donation of State assets in
violation of La. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(A) once any land that such an agreement has
been confected for once again becomes a navigable water bottom. In that situation, the
Constitution must be followed and the water bottom falls to State ownership once again
under La. Const. Art. IX, Sec. 3.
170 Again, subject to the limitations provided for in the freeze statute.
1" La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i).
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State just as they did, by operation of law, when the land eroded in the
first instance.
Thus, there is no constitutional prohibition against the granting of
perpetual mineral rights to riparian owners for land that may re-erode,
because the term perpetual in this instance refers to the life of the emer-
gent land. Additionally, such agreements must be accomplished pursuant
to the quid pro quo scheme envisioned by La. R.S. 41:1702(D)(2)(a)(i)
and mandated by La. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(C).
Another, albeit tangential, issue should be considered along with the
questions above: When does the riparian owner's right to the minerals
under the once-eroded land attach?
It is a basic tenet of obligations that a conditional agreement cannot
occur until the happening of the event (the "suspensive condition") upon
which that agreement depends.172 Accordingly, though the State may be-
gin to work on reclamation projects not long after the perfection of the
Act 626 agreements with riparian owners, the condition upon which
these agreements is based is the emergence of once-eroded land from
navigable waterways. Thus, I believe that until the land emerges from the
water, the riparian owner's rights in the underlying minerals have not
vested.
Another issue that merits some attention that is not often covered in
the literature is the issue of dredge spoil as a mineral. Much discussion
exists in the literature regarding the general inalienability of the State's
minerals but little, if any, concerns dredge spoil. The initial question is
whether dredged material is a mineral at all and, if it is, whether the dis-
card of such dredged material by entities such as the Corps of Engineers
in its general work to maintain the navigability of the State's waterways
is a violation of the Louisiana Constitution.
As to the ownership of dredged material, that matter was largely
resolved by La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 05-0222. That opinion stated that
sand and gravel dredged from the State's water bottoms does fall into the
category of "other mineral" under La. R.S. 30:209. As with any other
mineral deriving from State lands - of which there is no question that the
State has an interest - these "other minerals" that come from dredging
activities must also be owned by the State.'73 Accordingly, it is axiomatic
that sand and gravel dredged from State water bottoms does have intrin-
sic value and, due to the prohibitions against donations embodied in La.
172 See, La. C.C. Art. 1767 (referring to suspensive conditions).
173 This proposition is also supported by La. R.S. 31:4, which applies the provisions of
the Louisiana Mineral Code to "rights to explore for or mine or remove from land the soil
itself, gravel, shells, subterranean water, or other substances occurring naturally in or as a
part of the soil or geological formations on or underlying the land" [emphasis added].
These solid minerals would not have been included in the coverage of the Mineral Code
had the Legislature not intended for such to be considered minerals.
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Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(A), such materials cannot be given away without
adequate compensation.174
Based upon the State's ownership of such dredged materials, as was
noted in La. Atty. Gen. Op. No. 05-0222, if the Corps,'" or another fed-
eral agency, is not the party undertaking the dredging, and such dredging
is not being undertaken for the purpose of facilitating navigation, the
State has great latitude in the control of the disposition of the dredge ma-
terial.
The question of whether dredging entities can discard the dredged
material gets at the real question of whether the State can either charge a
fee for such minerals or otherwise require that the material be used in a
manner that benefits the State. The latter of these two possibilities is a
practice known as beneficial use. Beneficial use is when dredged materi-
als are taken from the State's navigable waterways, ports, and harbors,
and used to help in the efforts to rebuild the State's vanishing coast. This
practice has been a matter of much discussion in the scientific, environ-
mental, and governmental communities for some years now.17 Because
it is clear that dredged material is a mineral and because it derived (gen-
erally) from State water bottoms, Louisiana can mandate that the Corps
put the dredged material to a beneficial use through authority granted to
the State by Congress in the Coastal Zone Management Act ("CZMA").
The CZMA17 - a federal law that is locally administered by the Louisi-
ana Department of Natural Resources178 - provides clear authority for the
State to make beneficial use a precondition to certain administrative ac-
tions.
The primary objective of the CZMA is to
" The proposition that dredged materials are the property of the State and have intrin-
sic value is also supported by Ronald Adams Contractor, Inc. v. State er rel. Dept. of
Wildife & Fisheries, 2000-1490 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/28/01), 807 So.2d 881. Indeed, the
Department of Wildlife & Fisheries is statutorily tasked with administering the sale of
dredged material. La. R.S. 56:2011, et seq.
's "The United States Army Corps of Engineers (Corps), the agency primarily respon-
sible for maintaining federally designated navigation channels..." Gregory A. Bibler,
Contaminated Sediments: Are There Alternatives to Superfund?, 18 NAT. RES. & ENv'T.
56 (Fall 2003); see also, Robert P. Fowler, Jeffrey H. Wood, Thomas L. Casey, III, Main-
taining the Navigability ofAmerica's Inland Waterways, 21 NAT. RES. & ENv'T 16 (Fall
2006).
176 Lisa C. Schiavinato and James G. Wilkins, BENEFICIAL USE OF DREDGED
MATERIAL: To WHAT ExTENT Do STATES HAVE A VOICE? GACRDP Technical Report
Series (Louisiana Sea Grant Legal Program/Louisiana Governor's Applied Coastal Re-
search and Development Program 2004).
'" 16 U.S.C. 1451, et seq.
' La. R.S. 49:214.21, etseq.
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preserve, protect, develop, and where possible, to restore or en-
hance, the resources of the Nation's coastal zone for this and suc-
ceeding generations.179
With the CZMA, Congress recognized that there was a
national interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protec-
tion, and development of the coastal zone'go
due to the great demands on our coasts for food, energy, defense, recrea-
tion, transportation, and other industrial activities. In an effort to facili-
tate coastal preservation, Congress concluded that the most effective
management of the coastal zone could be achieved by cooperation
among federal, state, and local authorities. Therefore, one of the main
thrusts of the CZMA is to coordinate the efforts of individual states and
local communities with those of the federal government.' 8'
In furtherance of achieving this goal, any coastal state is eligible to
submit a coastal management plan ("CMP") for federal approval. To be
federally approved the CMP must be a comprehensive statement that lays
out the objectives, policies, and standards for the use of private and pub-
lic lands in the coastal zone and complies with all CZMA require-
ments.182 Once the CMP is approved, the State may receive federal assis-
tance and assume the authorities granted to the states under the
CZMA.' In 1980, Louisiana's CMP, called the Louisiana Coastal Re-
sources Program ("LCRP"), was federally approved. 1
One mechanism for cooperation between state and federal govern-
ments is the federal consistency provision of the CZMA.'" The CZMA
allows states with federally approved CMPs to require that federal agen-
cy activities in the coastal zone be consistent to the maximum extent
practicable with the state CMP.186 Federal regulations define "maximum
extent practicable" as
fully consistent with the enforceable policies of management pro-
grams unless full consistency is prohibited by existing law applica-
ble to the Federal agency.'8 7
179 16 U.S.C. 1452(1).
Iso 16 U.S.C. 1451 (a).
'8 16 U.S.C. 145 1(i)-(m). See also, Carolyn R. Langford, Marcelle S. Morel, James G.
Wilkins, Ryan M. Seidemann, The Mouse that Roared: Can Louisiana's Coastal Zone
Management Consistency Authority Play a Role in Coastal Restoration and Protection?,
20 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 97 (2006).
19 16 U.S.C. 1455.
18 16 U.S.C. 1455(b) & 1456.
194 Langford et al., supra, n.181 at 116.
18s 16 U.S.C. 1456.
186 16 U.S.C. 1456(c)(1)(A) & (c)(3).
18 15 C.F.R. 930.32(a)(1).
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It is within the consistency provision of the CZMA that the State of
Louisiana, via DNR (the administrator of the LCRP) finds its voice with
respect to telling the federal government that it must beneficially use
dredged material.' 8 The State, in order to grant consistency on federal
projects in the Louisiana coastal zone, should require the beneficial use
of dredged materials to restore Louisiana's ailing coast. Indeed, there are
at least two provisions of the LCRP that would render a proposed federal
action inconsistent with Louisiana's CMP if dredged material was not
beneficially used. 89
Dredge material from Louisiana water bodies is currently disposed
of by entities such as the Corps by either returning the material to the
water column downstream of the dredging operations or by shipping the
material to Ocean Dredged Material Disposal Sites ("ODMDS") in the
deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico.'" These are deep water areas desig-
nated by the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") as approved ar-
eas for disposing of dredged materials. Aside from the concerns of the
scientific community over the disturbance of sensitive deep-water habi-
tats,191 the deep-water disposal of dredged material is a waste of a valu-
able resource that could be used to rebuild Louisiana's coast.
It appears that the federal government is coming to a realization that
it is wasting this potentially vital resource. In a recent joint guidance re-
port by the EPA and the Corps, those agencies stated that,
[m]uch of the several hundred million cubic yards of sediment
dredged each year from U.S. ports, harbors, and waterways could be
" It should be noted that, because dredged material is considered a mineral, and thus
a thing of value, any entity (including private entities) that removes the material from a
State water bottom must compensate the State for the value of the material to avoid run-
ning afoul of La. Const. Art. VII, Sec. 14(A). The federal government presents a unique
situation in this regard, both due to its charge (via the Corps) to maintain the navigability
of the waters of the United States and through the benefit that the State gains through
such maintenance. However, as is discussed herein, these factors do not absolve the fed-
eral government of an obligation to somehow compensate the State for the loss of its
dredged material.
"9 LAC 43:1.707(B) states that,
[s]poil shall be used beneficially to the maximum extent practicable to improve
productivity or create new habitat, reduce or compensate for environmental damage
done by dredging activities, or prevent environmental damage.
(emphasis added). Further, LAC 43:1.707(G) states that,
[t]he alienation of state-owned property shall not result from spoil deposition ac-
tivities without the consent of the Department of Natural Resources.
The latter consistency requirement appears to restrict the wholesale disposal of dredge
material that derives from State property.
1" Schiavinato & Wilkins, supra, n.176.
'1 See e.g., Tony Koslow, THE SILENT DEEP: THE DIscOVERY, ECOLOGY, AND
CONSERVATION OF THE DEEP SEA (Univ. of Chigago 2007).
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used in a beneficial manner, such as for habitat restoration and crea-
tion, beach nourishment, aquaculture, forestry, agriculture, mine
reclamation, and industrial and commercial development. Yet most
of this dredged material is instead disposed of in open water, con-
fined disposal facilities, and upland disposal facilities.'92
Although the agencies are quick to caution that their recent musings
on the possible uses of dredged material are "intended solely as guid-
ance"19 and are thus not enforceable federal policies, their conclusions
support the enforcement of Louisiana's own coastal use guidelines that
require, to the maximum extent practicable, the beneficial use of dredged
materials in the coastal zone. Indeed, though the report is "guidance," the
Corps has an existing standard that supports the beneficial use of dredged
material.19 4
The major obstacle to the beneficial use of dredged material appears
to be a matter of cost.19 5 However, the excuse that the cost of an opera-
tion is too high and thus need not be complied with in order for a project
to be considered consistent with a state's coastal program is unaccept-
able. The CZMA clearly demonstrates that lack of funding is not an ex-
cuse for noncompliance with a federally-approved coastal management
plan.'1 In addition, 15 C.F.R. 930.32(a)(2) clearly states that Congress'
19 U.S. EPA and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
STANDARD IN THE BENEFICIAL USE OF DREDGED MATERIAL FROM U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS NEW AND MAINTENANCE NAVIGATION PROJECTS: BENEFICIAL USES OF
DREDGED MATERIALS, EPA842-B-07-002, ii (EPA/Corps 2007).
193 Id.
19 33 C.F.R. 335.7; 53 FR 14902. This standard requires that the Corps identify the
least costly dredged material disposal or placement alternative ... that is consistent
with sound engineering practices and meets all federal environmental requirements
EPA/Corps, supra, n.192 at 2.
195 Id. at ii.
19 15 C.F.R. 930.32(a)(3) states that,
Federal agencies shall not use a general claim of a lack of funding or insufficient
appropriated funds or failure to include the cost of being fully consistent in Federal
budget and planning processes as a basis for being consistent to the maximum ex-
tent practicable with an enforceable policy of a management program. The only
circumstance where a Federal agency may rely on a lack of funding as a limitation
on being fully consistent with an enforceable policy is the Presidential exemption
described in section 307(c)(1)(B) of the Act (16 USC 1456(c)(1)(B)). In cases
where the cost of being consistent with the enforceable policies of a management
program was not included in the Federal agency's budget and planning processes,
the Federal agency should determine the amount of funds needed and seek addi-
tional federal funds. Federal agencies should include the cost of being fully consis-
tent with the enforceable policies of management programs in their budget and
planning processes, to the same extent that a Federal agency would plan for the cost
of complying with other federal requirements.
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intent with the law that supports these regulations was to cause federal
agencies to adhere to the consistency requirements of the states. Under
this charge, the federal government requires its agencies to either con-
sider the increased expenses of requirements such as beneficial use when
requesting funding for projects or to adjust their funding requests once
they become aware of the increased costs of consistency.
To the extent that beneficial use of dredged materials exceeds the
"least costly" standard, the excess costs may be covered either by fed-
eral/non-federal cost shiaring or may be solely borne by a non-federal
entity.'97 The joint EPA/Corps report notes that the costs of beneficial
use projects that "do not contribute to USACE navigation, ecosystem
restoration, or flood and storm damage reduction missions" are to be
borne solely by the non-federal project sponsor.198 However, as has been
documented countless times in the academic literature, coastal restora-
tion and protection (the probable use of Louisiana's dredged materials) is
essential to support both ecosystem restoration'9 and flood and storm
damage reduction.2 00 Thus, should the federal government enter into
beneficial use projects with the State to restore Louisiana's coast, the
excess costs of such projects cannot, under federal law, be solely borne
by the State of Louisiana. An argument can be made that Louisiana need
not pay any of the costs of beneficial use, as the State supplies its own
resources (the dredge material) to the Corps, a reality that should sub-
stantially minimize the State's costs in these essential efforts.
Thus, although Louisiana cannot force the federal government to
beneficially use dredged material through legal concepts under Louisi-
ana's property and mineral law regimes, ' federal projects that implicate
Louisiana's coastal zone that do not contain provisions to beneficially
use dredged materials to offset coastal land loss are - in many cases - not
consistent with the State's approved CMP. In such instances, the State
can use its authority under the CZMA to require that the federal govern-
ment beneficially use dredge material for coastal restoration purposes.
See also, Schiavinato & Wilkins, supra, n. 176 at 20.
'9 EPA/Corps, supra, n.192 at 4.
198 Id.
200 See generally, Seidemann & Susman, supra, n. 161.
200 See generally, Seidemann, supra, n.78.
201 In other words, although dredged material is a mineral and does have value, the
State cannot force its use in the form of beneficial use. However, as noted above, this
does not relieve the federal government of the duty to compensate the State for the mate-
rial. One proposed means of compensation is for the State to enter into cooperative en-
deavor agreements with the Corps through which the State will not charge for the mate-
rial as long as the State's share of beneficial use costs is exchanged for this agreement not
to charge. Alternatively, the State should be charging for the dredged material.
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VII. Conclusion
It is difficult to sum up the disparate matters discussed herein. Thus,
suffice it to say that the State is bound by many arcane and complex legal
theories with respect to mineral matters. These matters, while consuming
the bulk of the time of governmental mineral lawyers also have substan-
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